

THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY IN WRITTEN TEXTS:
A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

BY

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1987

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by

Manuel Gonzalez-Pineiro

Words play a central part not only in the development of thought but in the historical growth of consciousness as a whole. A word is a microcosm of human consciousness.

LEV SEMENOVICH VYGOTSKY

DEDICATED TO
ALICIA AND MANUEL
WHO MADE ME POSSIBLE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to the Linguistics faculty at the University of Florida. Very special thanks go to William J. Sullivan, my committee chairman, for his continuous support and to Norman N. Markel for his friendship and advice. Also to be acknowledged are the contributions of the other members of the committee: Chauncey C. Chu and Kurt E. Kent.

Especially deserving of acknowledgment and thanks are the many friends I made in Gainesville and fellow students in linguistics and romance languages and literatures.

I would also like to thank the Department of Romance Languages and Literatures for the many years of teaching assistantships which permitted me to pursue this degree.

Last but not least, many thanks to the press syndicates for their permission to reprint the ten texts in the appendices.

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Used in the Headings of Textual Analysis Tables

AN	Argument Number
AR	Argumentative Act
CO	Connective
IL	Illocutionary Act
LO	Locutionary Act
PE	Perlocutionary Act
RN	Reference Number
SE	Sentence Number
SN	Speech Act Number
TY	Type
VC	Validity Claim

Used in the Dissertation

DES	Descriptive IL
ISA	Ideological Structure Analysis
NOR	Normative IL
RPS	Reality-Preserving Structure
SDD	Structure-Distorting Device
SUB	Subjective IL

Used in the Coding of Data

Types of ARs:

ar	Argument
ex	Explanation
ca	Counterargument or Refutation
aa	Acceptance of an Argument
ra	Rejection of an Argument
nc	No Comment

Argumentative VCs:

gr	Grounds or Minor Premiss
co	Conclusion
wa	Warrant or Major Premiss

Types of ILs:

ad	Advice, a type of NOR
ak	Question, a type of NOR

as	Inferential Statement, a type of DES
cg	Cognition, a type of SUB
dc	Declaration, a type of NOR
em	Emotion, a type of SUB
in	Intention, a type of SUB
or	Order, a type of NOR
pe	Prediction, a type of NOR
pm	Promise, a type of NOR
st	Statement of Fact, a type of DES

Illocutionary VCs:

av	Accepted Values (a type of cultural VC)
ca	Capability (a type of intentional VC)
fc	Factuality (a type of epistemic VC)
fl	Falsity (a type of epistemic VC)
ho	Hope (a type of intentional VC)
in	Intention (a type of intentional VC)
kn	Knowledge (a type of cognitive VC)
lk	Lack of Knowledge (a type of cognitive VC)
tr	Truth (a type of epistemic VC)
vo	Volition (a type of intentional VC)

Types of PEs:

in	Ideational Neutrality
is	Ideational Solidarity
pn	Interpersonal Neutrality
ps	Inperpersonal Solidarity

Perlocutionary VCs:

tc	Textual Clarity
----	-----------------

Types of COs:

aa	Association via Addition
ac	Association via Condition
ad	Association via Disjunction
ai	Association via Illustration
ao	Association via Objection

Used in the Coding of SDDs

Phonological SDDs:

00	Special Effects
----	-----------------

Syntactic SDDs:

10	Role Deletion
11	Process Deletion
12	Tense Deletion
13	Nominalization
14	Relexicalization

Semantic SDDs:

20	Abstraction
21	Generalization

22	Metaphor
23	Metonymy
24	Synecdoche
25	Hypallage
26	Irony
27	Litotes
28	Hyperbole
29	Personification
30	Euphemism

Pragmatic SDDs:

40	Normativized Description
41	Descriptivized Convention
42	Normativized Convention
43	Subjectivized Description
44	Descriptivized Expression
45	Normativized Expression
46	Subjectivized Convention
47	Unacceptable Claim
50	Speculative Illocution
51	Expressive Illocution
52	Ideational Domination
53	Interpersonal Domination
54	Textual Distortion

Argumentative SDDs:

60	Invalid Categorical Syllogism
61	Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism
62	Invalid Disjunctive Syllogism
63	Invalid Alternative Syllogism
70	Faulty Analogy
71	False Cause
72	Loading the Assertion
73	Either/or Fallacy
74	Complex Question
75	Misuse of Hypothetical Fact
76	Oversimplification
77	Faulty Generalization
78	Extension
79	Circular Argument
80	Personal Attack
81	Popular Appeal
82	Appeal to Ignorance
83	Semantic Argument
84	Genetic Fallacy
90	Tautology
91	Contingent Falsity
92	Contradiction
93	Countercriticism
94	Unstated Premiss
95	Unwarranted Conclusion
96	Unwarranted Assumption

Used in the Textual Analysis Tables

- + Vertical Connector:
 - Between two connectives = "and"
 - The place where a connective goes
- [] Text reconstructed from context
- () SDD number, not part of the text
- (a) Missing text is recoverable from context
- (p) Missing text is available, but was left out because it is irrelevant for the analysis
- (x) Missing text is not recoverable from context
- ... A dotted line across the page separates arguments

Used in the Appendices

- < > Sentence Number

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
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Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY IN WRITTEN TEXTS:
A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

By

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August 1987

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Major Department: Linguistics

In order to study the structure of ideology in written texts, Ideological Structure Analysis (ISA), a linguistic model for the analysis of ideology in texts based on syntax, semantics, pragmatics, logic, and speech-act theory, was constructed and tested on ten press commentaries by syndicated columnists who wrote either in favor or against the 1977 Supreme Court decision banning the use of federal funds for elective abortions. These commentaries were divided in two groups: Group A (5 columnists who wrote against the decision) and Group B (5 columnists who wrote in favor of the decision).

The model, based on the idea of language as a microcosm of human consciousness and on a modified 3-level speech-act structure, consists of a set of 56 categories, called

structure-distorting devices (SDDs), which allow the researcher to probe the phonological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and argumentative levels of a text for their presence or absence.

The 10-text data base yielded 25 out of the 56 types of SDDs posited and a total of 429 tokens, 288 in Group B and 141 in Group A. The hypothesis of this dissertation is supported by the presence of SDDs which characterize each group, and SDDs, shared by both group, which characterize this type of writing--advocacy literature.

It is suggested that further research on other textual types be carried out to test the validity of the SDDs posited for this study.

The original press commentaries are provided in the appendices.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Linguistic analysis, which provides the core of this dissertation, is an ideal tool for studying the structure and content of texts. Text producers encode texts in the context of some ideology. These ideologies may be overt (i.e., the ideology is explicit in the text) or they may be covert (i.e., the ideology is hidden behind specific phonological, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, or logical structures in the text). This suggests that ideology is a structure within a text and as such is amenable to linguistic analysis. This study focuses on the structural properties of ideologies in texts.

Ideological structure analysis (henceforth ISA), the linguistic analysis proposed here, represents an attempt at selecting and applying a series of theoretical ideas and analytical techniques drawn from syntax, semantics, pragmatics, logic, and speech-act theory to the study of ideology in texts.¹ This attempt is exploratory in nature and its goal is to validate the method developed in this dissertation.

Background of the Problem

There are three considerations that bear directly upon this study. These considerations are (1) the nature of texts, (2) the nature of ideology, and (3) the interaction of texts and ideology.

The Nature of Texts

If a text is to accurately represent reality (any one of the set of all possible worlds), it must contain a series of "reality-preserving structures" (henceforth RPSs). An ideal text can be defined as one which contains exactly those RPSs necessary for the text to represent the reality that corresponds to the world of its message and to communicate that message to any text user.

The Nature of Ideology

The term ideology is vague. This is due, in part, to the fact that there are too many definitions of this term. Simon (1977:4), quoting Waxman, states that "almost no two writers maintain the same definition." The term is often simply used pejoratively. In any case, Fiske (1982:144), quoting Raymond Williams, describes three uses of ideology: (1) "a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group," (2) "a system of illusory beliefs--false ideas or false consciousness--which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge," and (3) "the general process of the production of meaning and ideas."

These uses are not seen as autonomous or independent. According to Fiske (1982:146), use "1 is inside 2 which is

inside 3." This implies that ideology is, above all, involved in the communication and articulation of meaning.

Belsey (1980:42) indicates that "it is possible to argue that insofar as language is a way of articulating experience, it necessarily participates in ideology [italics in the original], the sum of the ways in which people both live and represent to themselves [and others, I might add] their relationship to the conditions of their existence." Since one of its effects is the distortion of reality in the process of providing plausible explanations, ideology, according to Brown (1973:9), "sustains and explains differences between East and West (whether in Europe or Asia), North and South (Korea, Vietnam or America), Black and White (in the United States and in South Africa), Right and Left. Ideologies also 'explain' differences between rich and poor, old and young, and between men and women."

Furthermore, text producers may either hide or show their ideological stance, depending on the prevailing ideology of the text users for whom they produce their texts. However, if text producers want to hide their ideological stance, they must use "structure-distorting devices" (henceforth SDDs). These ideological SDDs are the focus of this study.

The Interaction of Texts and Ideology

Whenever text producers produce texts, they communicate something about a particular reality and something else about a particular ideology. A text with all its RPSs in

place will reveal clearly its ideology. For example, it is easier to hide ideology in a text like John Doe is free than one with John Doe is free from his job to play tennis every day. In the case of John Doe is free, text users may provide their own referents for the missing roles (source, goal, time), and the dominant ideology will have a lot to do with what kind of referents they will choose or ignore.

Text users must reconstruct the meaning of texts. Covert ideology interferes with this reconstruction.

Statement of the Problem

This study focuses upon 10 press commentaries which appeared in U.S. newspapers immediately after the Supreme Court's decision (June 20, 1977) that federal funds cannot be used to finance elective abortions. The corpus is divided into two groups: Group A (5 text producers who wrote against the decision) and Group B (5 who wrote in favor of the decision).

The study serves two equally important purposes. The first is to determine (a) the inventory of ideological mechanisms present, (b) the relative frequency of these ideological mechanisms, (c) the association of ideological mechanisms to each group, and (d) the residue of ideological mechanisms which are randomly distributed between the two groups in the corpus.

The second purpose of this dissertation is intimately tied to the first. It is to posit a series of ideological mechanisms and their structural and functional properties,

developed from an eclectic choice of linguistic theories, and to describe their relations to texts.

Justification for the Study

The validity and appropriateness of a linguistic approach to ideology is mentioned in the literature (cf. Fiske 1982, Rosengren 1981, Eagleton 1980, Fowler 1981, Kress and Hodge 1979). For instance, Brown (1973:10), talking about ideologies, states that "verbally-based measures are therefore appropriate for their study." Likewise, Kress and Hodge (1979:6) propose that the scope of linguistics should include the study of ideology because "language is an instrument of control as well as of communication. Linguistic forms allow significance to be conveyed and to be distorted. In this way hearers can be both manipulated and informed, preferably manipulated while they suppose they are being informed."

Furthermore, the information derived from this study may benefit both linguists and social researchers. The specific data generated by the research method will permit a linguist to evaluate the practical applications of similar projects. In addition, the research design employed in this study may serve as the basis for an ongoing program of critical linguistics.

Social researchers may benefit from the details of the research method used in this study. The analysis proposed here has traditionally been used to provide a semiotic

analysis of linguistic data, but as this study suggests, it can be used to analyze ideology.

Assumptions

This study was conducted in the context of three major assumptions:

(1) Ideology is involved in the communication of meaning.

(2) Ideology is a structure within a text.

(3) Ideology as a structure depends on the linguistic structures of the text to carry out its function.

Limitations of the Study

The theoretical context of this dissertation was necessarily limited in scope. The concepts discussed in this context do not exhaust the scope of the field. Many other questions and issues that were not included are potentially important to the total picture of a theory of ideology, but they are not necessarily relevant to the present study.

A second limitation of the study involved the size of the sample analyzed. Due to the experimental nature of the research method used, the size of the sample had to be large enough to establish valid results yet small enough to be manageable.

Reliability

The reliability of this study was established at several levels. First, the texts were broken down into sentences and a reference number assigned to them. A

sentence begins with an upper case letter and ends in a period or question mark. If the sentence is in quotation marks or follows a colon, the quoted or elaborated material is part of the previous sentence. Second, sentences were broken down into propositions which were, in turn, combined into arguments and their validity verified by a logician. All arguments were cast in syllogistic form for the sake of convenience. Other mechanisms could have been used, but they may be less familiar to the reader. At this point I am not judging the content of the arguments. This will be left for a future project.

Third, the SDDs, the categories used in the analysis, are backed up by well-established concepts in linguistics and logic.

Methodology

This section on methodology briefly outlines the basic research method used in this study. It describes the method of ideological structure analysis and then concisely shows how this method was applied to the present study.

A Description of ISA

At the core of this study is ideological structure analysis, a form of linguistic analysis. It is a method useful to the social researcher who requires a maximum amount of information from a limited amount of material. In simple terms, it is a linguistic method used to determine how a text conveys ideology.

Ideological structure analysis is a complex method for studying ideology and its complexity is evident in the amount of labor it involves. The method consists in dividing a text into sentences, which are cast in a syllogistic form of argumentation. Then speech acts are assigned to each part of an argument and, finally, the analysis is carried out by searching each argument for the presence or absence of SDDs.

The method (simplified). The initial step in ideological structure analysis is the conversion of a text into argumentative acts with their corresponding speech acts.

According to speech-act theory (cf. Searle 1969; Searle, Kiefer, and Bierwisch 1980; Rogers, Wall, and Murphy 1977), each sentence or utterance contains a proposition or set of referring expressions (the locutionary act), an explicit or implicit reference indicating the type of linguistic act being performed (the illocutionary act), and an explicit or implicit reference to the intended purpose of the linguistic act (the perlocutionary act). From the above it follows that every proposition combines with an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act to form a speech act. The speech act embedded in an argumentative act is the unit of analysis for this study. Some of these terms are defined later in this chapter and their application explained in more detail in Chapter II.

The Method as Applied to this Study

Given the general method used in this study, it is necessary to describe the sample and to present a brief outline of the research design, so that the reader can ascertain the usefulness of the method.

The sample. The present study focuses on 10 press commentaries which appeared in U.S. newspapers immediately after the Supreme Court's decision (June 20, 1977) that federal funds cannot be used to finance elective abortions. These 10 commentaries have been chosen for three reasons. First, they are by widely-read columnists. Second, the columnists openly advocate one side of the issue or the other and make no attempt to conceal their biases. The third reason for choosing the 10 commentaries as the focal point of this study is a practical one. An examination of Viewpoint: America's Syndicated Journalists on File reveals that no other issue has evoked commentary by so many columnists. The section "Data Collection" in Chapter IV provides more detailed information on how the sample was selected.

The research design. The present analysis is based on a frequency count. The frequency count determines the presence of SDDs in the commentaries and ascertains which SDDs were used most frequently with the left-of-center (Group A) and right-of-center (Group B) commentaries.

Definitions

This dissertation relies upon terms which may be unfamiliar to the reader. Following are definitions for these terms, which will be discussed in detail and with examples in Chapters II and III.

Argumentative Act (AR)--the logical structure of a text consisting of a series of connected speech acts which relate to the warrant, grounds, and conclusion of an argument as a subpart of a text.

Domination--a type of power relationship based on sex, age, class, or race.

Ideological Structure Analysis (ISA)--a semiotic² analysis consisting of identifying the functions of utterances and of establishing whether the utterances and the structures they are part of contain SDDs.

Ideology--a structure within a text which provides a viewpoint that advocates (1) the acceptance of a reality reflecting domination or the rejection of a reality reflecting solidarity, (2) the acceptance of linguistic domination or the rejection of linguistic solidarity, or (3) the acceptance of textual distortion or the rejection of textual clarity.

Illocutionary Act (IL)--an utterance containing information referring to the act a text producer performs when producing a text. This component may be made explicit by the use of performative verbs

("I state, I ask, I promise" and so on),

adverbs ("obviously"), and phrases ("It is true that").

Locutionary Act (LO)--an utterance containing information referring to the physical world.

Perlocutionary Act (PE)--an utterance containing information referring to the mechanism that triggers the cultural code which explains the textual activity (the illocutionary, locutionary, and argumentative acts).

Reality-Preserving Structure (RPS)--an ideal structure that, when present in a text, reveals clearly the content of an utterance. The ideal text would consist of RPSs only.

Solidarity--a type of relationship where a person or group, socially in a position of privilege, identifies itself and defends a person or group subject to a situation of domination.

Speech Act--the linguistic structure of a text consisting of an illocutionary act, a locutionary act, and a perlocutionary act.

Structure-Distorting Device (SDD)--a mechanism that distorts a textual (linguistic or logical) structure to provide cover for an ideology.

Text--a message of any length consisting of one or more argumentative acts which are unified and complete in themselves, and conveying information and ideology.

Utterance--a single idea or primitive proposition which fulfills a specific function in the linguistic or logical structure of a text.

Overview of the Dissertation

Since ideological structure analysis is a research tool for the social researcher, linguists must face issues relevant to texts and a theory of ideology before they can adequately complete their research. Without an understanding of such issues, it would be difficult to establish a connection between texts and ideology. This is the assumption of this dissertation. Chapter II, "Texts and Ideology," focuses on these issues. Written from a linguistic perspective, Chapter II views a text as the locus of ideology. The chapter explores the implications of this view for a theory of ideology. This view serves as a guiding principle in this exploration.

The consideration of ideology as a structure within a text and the idea that text users can uncover the ideological stance of text producers lead to Chapter III, "Ideological Structure Analysis." Chapter III focuses on ideological structure analysis as a mass media research tool. A survey of the literature reveals that, although no such analysis has been proposed, there are several linguistic techniques that have been applied unsystematically to the analysis of ideology. In a way, this study heeds Kress' and Hodge's (1979:2) plea that these techniques, different applications, and varied theoretical

considerations "be given unity and coherence through a subsuming theoretical framework." The last part of Chapter III outlines a research design for ideological structure analysis. In turn, the outline shows that ideological structure analysis is a research tool worthy of serious consideration. Chapters II and III provide the context for Chapter IV, "Methodology and Results." The focus of Chapter IV is the actual ideological structure analysis performed for this dissertation. Chapter IV outlines the details of the ideological structure analysis and its results.


Chapter V, "Summary and Conclusions," summarizes the results outlined in Chapter IV. It provides conclusions based on the research findings and makes suggestions for further study.

Notes

1. Specifically, ISA is based on Vygotsky's (1962:153) idea that "a word is a microcosm of human consciousness." In my opinion human consciousness consists of (1) knowledge about referents, (2) referential viewpoints, (3) knowledge about social interaction, (4) interactional viewpoints, (5) knowledge about the production of texts, (6) textual viewpoints, and (7) metaknowledge about the logical organization of all of the above.

These components find their textual expression in the syntactical, semantical, and pragmatic dimensions of semiosis (cf. Morris 1938), in the ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions of language (cf. Halliday 1970), and in the form of syllogistic argumentation (cf. Rieke and Sillars 1984). These ideas led to the creation of a modified 3-level (cultural = warrant, contextual = grounds, and textual = conclusion) speech-act framework (see diagram below and Key to Abbreviations and Symbols, p. x), which provides the linguistic structure for the seven components of human consciousness.

Modified 3-level Speech Act



2. This term is used in the sense defined by Morris (1938:6-7). It refers to the relations between signs ("syntactical dimension of semiosis"), between a sign and its referent ("semantic dimension of semiosis"), and between the sign and its users ("pragmatic dimension of semiosis").

CHAPTER II TEXTS AND IDEOLOGY

Ideological structure analysis can be a valuable tool for the study of certain aspects of ideology. In order to understand and appreciate its scope, nature, and limitations, it must be placed in the context of a theory of texts and a theory of ideology, which in turn must be placed within the context of a general theory of human action. Linguists who use ideological structure analysis for the study of ideology in texts must reach some conclusions about the nature of texts and ideology in order to conduct their tasks adequately.

Overview of the Chapter

This chapter is written from the perspective of language as social action and it reflects the idea that ideology is behind social activity in general. The study which is the focus of this dissertation (Chapter IV) was conducted in the context of this idea. In turn, the ideas underlying this chapter resulted from a survey of the literature followed by a reflection on its contents. The assumption of this chapter is that texts and ideology are the result of human action.

A human actor produces a text and a cultural code which explains the meaning of both the action and the text. This cultural code is ideology (cf. Geertz 1973). This statement is based on the idea that a culture is a network of symbols and, according to Geertz (1973:207), we should be "examining ideologies as systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of interworking meanings."

In addition, this chapter focuses upon selected issues relevant to a theory of texts and a theory of ideology. These issues include the nature, types, and functions of texts and ideologies.

The chapter concludes with a suggestion that individuals may serve their interests by being able to uncover the ideological stances that pervade texts. This suggestion leads into Chapter III's focus upon ideological structure analysis.

A General Theory of Social Action

In order to understand ideology and its connection with texts, we must discuss social action. According to Souza Filho (1984:79), social action "takes into account the behaviour of others as participants in the same context." Human actors, motivated by the interplay between their individual needs (desires, wishes, interests, and intentions) and their social obligations, perform acts which produce certain results (situations and/or products). These acts and their results trigger explanations of their significance within their historical context. The

explanations, which are aimed at the rest of the community, are the cultural codes I call ideology (cf. Geertz 1973). The ideology can be produced willfully or unconsciously, and human actors can manipulate or distort the acts or their results or both. In other words, ideology is in the acts themselves and it also explains the acts to the community.

Finally, human actors may contract power relationships with people (based on gender, race, and/or age), animals, and the environment. These situations may be either symmetric or asymmetric and, depending on how much distortion of the reality is used to hide them, their ideology will show more or less clearly.

Language as Social Action

In his homology for action and language Souza Filho (1984:77) advances a comparison between "interaction" and "communication" and between "procedure" and "sentence." A text producer, like any other human actor engaged in social action, performs certain argumentative acts which produce a set of speech acts and their referring expressions or propositions. Some speech acts do not have propositions.¹ However, this does not invalidate my assertion. These argumentative acts, speech acts, and/or their propositions trigger certain cultural codes. Therefore, a text is, in its shortest version, an argumentative act with its corresponding set of speech acts and their referring expressions or proposition and an ideology-triggering structure (the perlocutionary act).

It is now necessary to examine ideology and texts in some detail. The understanding of these two topics provides the grounds on which this study is founded.

Ideology

Since the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy coined the term ideology in 1796 (cf. Williams 1976), it has undergone many changes. Fabian (1965:1) states that "most writers are still struggling with the problem of a satisfactory definition" of this word and Geertz (1973:207) criticizes social scientists for not "seriously examining ideologies as systems of interacting symbols." However, a survey of the literature reveals that the term is used in two ways. The statement of the problem, according to Thompson (1984:4), goes like this:

"ideology" is employed by many authors as if it were a purely descriptive term: one speaks of "systems of thought," of "systems of belief" of "symbolic practices" which pertain to social action or political projects. This use of the term gives rise to what may be called a neutral conception [italics in the original] of ideology. No attempt is made, on the basis of this conception, to distinguish between the kinds of action or projects which ideology animates; ideology is present in every political program, irrespective of whether the program is directed towards the preservation or transformation of the social order. There is, however, another sense of "ideology" which is evident in the current literature. In the writings of some authors, ideology is essentially linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power--that is, to the process of maintaining domination. This use of the term expresses what may be called a critical conception [italics in the original] of ideology. It preserves the negative connotation which has been conveyed by the term throughout most of its history and it binds the analysis of ideology to the question of critique.

When applied to texts, ideology operates at three levels. We must distinguish between the ideology of the reality portrayed by the text (solidarity or domination between the actors in the reality) and the ideology of the textual activity itself (solidarity or domination between text producer and text user). In addition, there is a third level of ideology which has to do with whether these two ideologies and whatever other information the text contains are expressed--explained--via clarity (use of RPSs) or via distortion (use of SDDs).

These three levels of ideology correspond loosely to Halliday's (1970:143) basic functions of language: (1) the "ideational" function "gives structure to experience, and helps determine our way of looking at things," (2) the "interpersonal" function establishes "the communication roles created by language itself," and (3) the "textual" function "enables the speaker or writer to construct 'texts,' or connected passages of discourse that is situationally relevant."

Viewed from a neutral perspective, we must think of ideational solidarity, ideational domination, interpersonal solidarity, interpersonal domination, textual clarity, and textual distortion as ideologies. However, from a critical perspective only ideational domination, interpersonal domination, and textual distortion are expressions of ideologies.

In this study I am using the term "ideology" in Thompson's critical sense. In my analysis perlocutionary acts will be used to code these three ideologies.

Texts

A text² is a linguistic product that issues from certain types of linguistic acts that people as text producers engage in for human communication. The function of a text, according to Habermas' (1979:67) model of linguistic communication, is to serve:

as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) "the external world" as the totality of existing states of affairs, (b) "our social world" as the totality of all the normatively regulated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) "a particular inner world" (of the speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences.

This model suggests that a text is a representation of one of the following: descriptive acts, normative acts, subjective acts, or a combination of them. These representations are embedded in linguistic structures called speech acts. Speech acts are embedded in or organized around logical structures called argumentative acts. Argumentative acts, according to Ferrara (1985:146), provide the "pragmatic coherence to a text." A text may consist of one or more argumentative acts.

Argumentative Acts

The argument is the basic unit of human reasoning. It is, as Rieke and Sillars (1984:5) have noted, "the process of advancing, supporting, modifying, and criticizing claims

so that appropriate decision makers may grant or deny adherence."

This unit has three elements in its full form: a claim (or conclusion), grounds (or minor premiss), and the warrant (or major premiss). However, everyday argumentation hardly ever uses this form (cf. Fearnside 1980). For ease of communication or because of the obviousness of their arguments, people generally use the enthymeme, a reduced version of the expanded form. The enthymeme leaves out a part of the argument. The omitted part may be one of the premisses or the conclusion. The following examples, taken from Fearnside (1980:156-157), illustrate the enthymeme:

1) "That board will be hard to work because it's oak"

Warrant: All oak is hard to work

Grounds: That board is oak

Claim: Therefore, that board will be hard to work

2) "Those who start smoking are likely to wish they hadn't, and you're starting"

Warrant: Those who start smoking are likely to wish they hadn't

Grounds: You are starting to smoke

Claim: You are likely to wish you hadn't

In the first example the warrant is missing and in the second the claim. The important thing is that the missing parts of the argument can be easily recovered from the context.

The following types of argumentative acts are posited:

1. ar = argument ("I want to prove something, I want to justify some claim, I want to establish the truth of something")
2. ex = explanation ("I want to explain why/how something happened")
3. ca = counterargument or refutation ("I want to criticize an argument, I want to refute an argument, I want to show an argument is unsound")
4. aa = acceptance of an argument ("I accept the claim, I agree that, I stipulate that, yes")
5. ra = rejection of an argument ("I reject/challenge/doubt/deny the claim, no")
6. nc = no comment ("I reserve comment, no comment, I neither reject a claim nor accept it")

In addition, there are some validity claims associated with argumentative acts. They identify the nature of the arguments, thus making argumentative moves explicit (cf. Fogelin 1982, Rieke and Sillars 1984). These validity claims may be realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases, which provide clues for the classification of propositions as grounds, conclusion, or warrant.

The following types are posited:

1. gr = grounds ("I offer this reason/premise in support of my conclusion/claim")

2. co = conclusion ("I draw the conclusion, I claim, therefore, so, consequently, accordingly, evidently, apparently, then, thus, hence, so we see, for this reason, it must be, it seems that, it follows that, it implies that, that is [to say], seemingly, it suggests that, it demonstrates that, in conclusion")
3. wa = warrant ("I offer this statement to justify using the grounds as the basis for the conclusion or claim, I observe, I have already shown that")

The following words and phrases, taken from Fearnside (1980:137 and 158), serve as indicators of both grounds (the minor premiss) and the warrant (the major premiss):

if, when, where, in the event, given that, then, had . . . occurred, as a result, consequently, because, for, since, inasmuch as, it follows from, it is evident from, we know from, granting that, assuming that, supposing that, seeing that, in view of the fact that, on the ground that, on the premise that.

This and other lists given in this and the next chapters are neither complete nor exclusive of other expressions. Their inclusion is meant to elucidate the discussion.

Speech Acts

As the linguistic unit, the speech act is realized through an illocutionary act, a locutionary act, and a perlocutionary act.

Illocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts are the acts text producers perform when producing a text. They can be made explicit by the use of performative prefixes ("I state, I ask, I promise, I order," and so on). They are used to encode the types of acts performed and the validity claims advanced by the text producer. Based on Habermas' model, the following types of illocutionary acts are posited:

A. Descriptive (DES):

1. as = inferential statement ("I assert an established truth, principle, or theory")
2. st = statement of fact ("I state a fact")

B. Normative (NOR):

3. ad = advice ("I advise, I recommend, I suggest")
4. ak = question ("I ask, I wonder")
5. dc = declaration ("I declare", e.g. "you're fired")
6. or = order ("I command, I order")
7. pe = prediction ("I predict, ...will...")
8. pm = promise ("I promise, I pledge, I will...")

C. Subjective (SUB):

9. cg = cognition ("I express a certain personal cognitive state")
10. em = emotion ("I express a certain personal feeling or emotional state")
11. in = intention ("I express a certain personal intentional state")

Illocutionary acts are embedded in argumentative acts. In other words, for each part (warrant, grounds, or conclusion) of an argument there can be one or more speech acts.

Validity claims are used to indicate the comments that text producers may make about an aspect of the speech act. There are seven types of comments that can be made:

1. Epistemic.

Epistemic comments are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the text producer's judgement on the factuality of propositions. According to Givon (1984:79), they "impart the speaker's evaluation as to the truth, falsity, possibility, or probability of a state or event." The absence of an epistemic comment is interpreted as factuality by default, if the speech act is a statement of fact, or truth, if an inferential statement.

The following types are posited:

fc = factuality (the text producer is committed to the truth of the proposition).

Examples include expressions such as

- "I saw" (text producer is a reliable eyewitness)
- "I was told by X" (where X = agent of action)
- "I was told by Y" (where Y = reliable eyewitness)
- "I was told by Z" (where Z = indefinite source)

pr = probability (the text producer is committed to neither the truth nor the falsity of the proposition).

Examples include expressions such as

- "probably"
- "perhaps"
- "may"
- "as everybody knows"
- "as is well known"
- "it is obvious"
- "it is easy to see that"
- "everyone agrees that"
- "unless I am sadly mistaken"
- "no one will deny that"
- "I can assure you"
- "it is just common sense that"
- "as you will soon discover"

nt = necessary truth (the text producer asserts the necessity of truth and is committed to both the truth of the proposition and the necessity of truth).³

Examples include expressions such as

- "must"

ps = possibility (the text producer denies that the proposition must be false).⁴

Examples include expressions such as
 -"possibly"

tr = truth (the text producer asserts the truth of the proposition without commitment to necessity of same).⁵

Examples include expressions such as
 -"It is true that"

fl = falsity (the text producer is committed to the falsity of the proposition).

Examples include expressions such as
 -"I wish..."

In general, factuality (or truth), probability, possibility, and necessary truth can be combined with falsity to generate various degrees of falsity: false, probably false, possibly false, and necessarily false.⁶

2. Evaluative.

Evaluative comments are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the text producer's negative or positive attitudes toward propositions. According to Givon (1984:78), they "impart the speaker's judgment about either the desirability (from his/her point of view) of the event/state/action or its rightness/wrongness." The absence of an evaluative comment is interpreted as neutrality by default. The following types of comments are posited:

po = positive ("right, good")

ng = negative ("wrong, bad")

3. Emotive.

Emotive claims are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the text producer's emotional states or feelings. The following types are posited:

jo = joy ("I am glad")

sa = sadness ("I am sad, I am sorry")

fe = fear ("I am afraid")

lo = love ("I love")

ha = hate ("I hate")

4. Deontic.

Deontic claims are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the logic of obligation and permission on the part of the text producer (cf. Lyons 1977). The following types are posited:

on = obligation not to perform ("shouldn't, forbid")

op = obligation to perform ("must, should")

pp = permission to perform ("may, can, shall")

5. Intentional.

Intentional claims are generally realized by verb, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the text producer's intentions. The following types are posited:

vo = volition ("I want")

in = intention ("I intend")

ca = capability ("I can, I am able to")

ho = hope ("I hope")

6. Cultural.

Cultural claims are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, or phrases. They identify the text producer's cultural justification for certain inferential statements.

The following types are posited:

av = accepted values (such as norms, beliefs, behaviors, truths, and principles)

uv = unaccepted values (such as norms, beliefs, behaviors, truths, and principles)

7. Cognitive.

Cognitive claims are generally realized by verbs, adverbs, and phrases. They identify the text producer's knowledge status. The absence of a cognitive comment is interpreted as knowledge by default. The following types are posited:

lk = lack of knowledge ("I don't know, I don't remember")

kn = knowledge ("I know, I remember")

un = uncertainty ("I don't think, I don't believe")

be = belief ("I believe, I think")

In general, validity claims refer to all kinds of linguistic (i.e., prosodic, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) devices for modifying a speech act. In part they correspond, for instance, to the devices for "boosting" and "attenuating" illocutionary force proposed by Holmes (1984).

The discussion of illocutionary acts and their functions is complete. I turn now to a definition of locutionary and perlocutionary acts.

Locutionary acts. Locutionary acts code the propositions or referential expressions emanating from the linguistic acts.

In case grammar (cf. Fillmore 1968, Lyons 1977, Sullivan 1980) a sentence is conceived of as consisting of modality (negation, tense, aspect, mood) and a proposition (a main verb and its array of obligatory and optional roles). In this study propositions and negation will be analyzed.

The locutionary act is used to arrange in a linear, linguistic way (the textual world) the relations existing in the world in terms of roles and processes (cf. Halliday 1970). Roles are always associated with a particular process (action, event, state, relation, i.e. a verb in most cases). The number of roles required in any locutionary act is determined by the inherent nature of the process associated with them. Halliday (1970:150) gives the following examples which show this associative characteristic of roles clearly:

(a) Roderick pelted the crocodile with stones.

(b) The crocodile got pelted.

The verb pelt (a process) is always associated with three inherent roles: a pelter (agent), a pelted (patient), and something to pelt with (instrument). In the case of

sentence (b) two of the roles (agent and instrument) are not included.

Note that I am not working with the concept of optional versus obligatory roles, but with inherent versus non-inherent roles (cf. Halliday 1970:150). In the case of The crocodile got pelted, agent and instrument are optional roles in English and, consequently, can be deleted.

However, the same two roles represent inherent characteristics associated with the reality conveyed by the verb pelt. Lacking the identity of the pelter and the means of pelting, this sentence has the effect of hiding these two roles. One could say that this sentence is nonideological because the person who uttered it did not know the identities of the two missing roles (agent and instrument). Of course, this may well be the case, but the text producer cannot keep the text user from drawing certain conclusion about the missing roles. Therefore, the final consequence is that society's dominant ideology will affect the referent the text user chooses or ignores for the missing roles.

Another concept in need of explanation is recoverability from context. In my analysis the inherent roles of a proposition found somewhere else (within or outside the text) are recoverable and, although absent from the proposition itself, the information is there. Inherent roles whose recoverability is possible count as if they were in their propositions.

Perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts indicate the intended effects text producers can have on text user.

There are many possibilities for the effects an argumentative act can have on a text user. In order to manage this discussion we must identify the minimal set of effects or goals that can be intended by the text producer. These goals are (1) to convey true and complete information about the objective or subjective worlds and (2) to get someone to accept something while maintaining symmetric power relationships. When these standard goals (clarity and solidarity) are violated, distortion and domination are the effects of these argumentative acts. They represent the linguistic (textual) and nonlinguistic (social) components of ideology.

These effects or goals are cultural metamessages which explain the meanings of the messages embedded in the linguistic and logical structures of the text. If we view ideology as a "cultural system" (Geertz (1973:193), then perlocutionary acts set ideology in motion, i.e., they trigger and code ideological explanations or viewpoints in the cultural system the text is part of. At a neutral level, these linguistic and nonlinguistic viewpoints, whether they advocate the acceptance or the rejection of symmetric power relationships (regardless of sex, age, and race) or whether they are expressed in an overt or covert manner, are ideological. However, at a critical level, these viewpoints are ideological only insofar as they advocate the acceptance

of asymmetric, or the rejection of symmetric, power relationships and insofar as they are expressed in a covert manner. Since I adopt here a critical conception of ideology, only distortion and domination are ideological; clarity and solidarity are nonideological. Consequently, the following sources for the types of perlocutionary acts are posited:

1) ideological:

Ideational Domination

Interpersonal Domination

2) nonideological:

Ideational Solidarity

Interpersonal Solidarity

Ideational Neutrality (the default value)

Interpersonal Neutrality (the default value)

In addition, there are some validity claims that are used to indicate whether the ideational and interpersonal ideologies are expressed textually in an overt (clarity via RPSs) or covert (distortion via SDDs) manner. The following types of validity claims are posited:

1) ideological:

Textual Distortion

2) nonideological:

Textual Clarity

Connectives

According to Beaugrande and Dressler (1981:71), a connective is a "device for signalling the relationships

among events or situations" and for maintaining cohesion in a text (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976).

Connectives are used to relate via association two speech acts or two argumentative acts. Therefore, a general set of connectives with examples valid for each of these levels of connectivity is proposed:

1. aa = association via addition

- "and"
- "as well as"
- "moreover"
- "furthermore"
- "in addition"

2. ao = association via objection

- "but"
- "though"
- "however"
- "although"
- "unlike"
- "by contrast"

3. ad = association via disjunction

- "either...or"
- "and/or"
- "or"

4. ac = association via condition

- "if"
- "if so"

5. ai = association via illustration

- "such as"

- "for example"

- "for instance"

- "in other words"

- "that is"

At one level they serve as "pragmatic connectives," according to Dijk (1977:447), and their function is to structure and relate all the speech acts that go with each part (warrant, grounds, or conclusion) of an argumentative act. At another level they are used to relate two argumentative acts.

According to Beaugrande and Dressler (1981:72), and is the default connective for the two levels of connectives, "since, unless specified otherwise, events and situations are combined additively in a textual world."

Interaction of Texts and Ideology

A text is a composite of two interacting constituents: a textual (linguistic and logical) structure and an ideological structure. These two constituents of the text deal with different aspects of the textual world. Together they supply the information needed by text users for interpretation.

Notes

1. There is a limited set of linguistic acts without referring expressions or propositions. An example is Ouch!, where the referents are not expressed linguistically, but contextually. However, this is irrelevant for the purpose of this study.

2. I use the term text in the sense defined by Halliday and Hasan (1976:1): "any passage, spoken or written, of whatever length, that does form a unified whole."

3. William J. Sullivan's personal communication. Although nt (necessary truth) is included in the discussion about epistemic validity claims for speech acts, it will be treated as qq (conclusion) because it behaves as an argumentative validity claim.

4. William J. Sullivan's personal communication.

5. William J. Sullivan's personal communication.

6. William J. Sullivan's personal communication.

CHAPTER III IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to detail the nature of ideological structure analysis. As stated in Chapter II, many issues relevant to texts and ideology are also relevant to ideological structure analysis as a research tool for mass media researchers. An understanding of ideology and texts provides these researchers not only with a philosophical basis from which to conduct their research but also with a defense of ideological structure analysis as a valuable research tool.

Overview of the Chapter

A survey of the literature reveals that several authors have proposed, at one time or another, ways of analyzing different aspects of ideology. However, these efforts have not produced a theoretical framework capable of guiding the researcher through the maze of ideology. The method proposed here will provide that guidance. For this reason, the first part of this chapter focuses upon the definition of ideological structure analysis. I first assemble the bits and pieces of methodology scattered through the literature into a coherent theoretical framework for ideological structure analysis.

The last section of this chapter organizes the aspects of method in a typical ideological structure analysis research design. This outline shows how ideological structure analysis is similar to research in other disciplines. The assumption is that ideological structure analysis is a research method worthy of serious considerations.

The Levels of Ideological Structure Analysis

Ideological structure analysis represents my effort to unify different techniques of analysis, linguistic and otherwise, into a coherent method. For the sake of clarity, these techniques have been labeled here as (1) phonological SDDs, (2) syntactic SDDs, (3) semantic SDDs, (4) pragmatic SDDs, and (5) argumentative SDDs. The relative weight of each SDDs in its importance to ISA in general will, for the time being, remain implicit. Other SDDs may be added to this inventory, and some that have been selected may be deleted or combined as needed. In this section each SDD will be defined, illustrated, and its effects noted.

Phonological SDDs

1. Special effects (Code 00)

Definition: The use of alliteration (repetition of the same initial sound or sounds in two or more words), consonance (repetition of the same consonant sound in two or more words), or assonance (repetition of the same vowel sound in two or more words) in a sentence (cf. DeVito 1986).

Example: I like Ike vs I am for Eisenhower.

Effect: The use of attractive, pleasing sounds (forms) to make the content more palatable.

Syntactic SDDs

2. Role deletion (Code 10)

Definition: The absence of an inherent role associated with a process, both missing from the proposition and impossible to recover from context.

Example: The gator got pelted vs (John) pelted the gator (with a stone).

Effect: Role deletion gives an incomplete picture of the reality related to a process.

3. Process deletion (Code 11)

Definition: The absence of a non-copular (i.e., verb forms other than those of "to be") process, which cannot be recovered from context, in a proposition.

Example: German submarines in Scandinavian waters vs German submarines (do/did/will do something) in Scandinavian waters (and not German submarines are/were in Scandinavian waters).

Effect: Process deletion eliminates the type of activity and the time of the activity.

4. Tense deletion (Code 12)

Definition: The absence of tense, which cannot be recovered from context, in a process.

Example: Political decision makers vs (Somebody) (decides/decided/will decide) political matters.

Effect: Tense deletion eliminates any reference to the time of the activity.

5. Nominalization (Code 13)

Definition: The deletion of one or more roles and the tense, which cannot be recovered from context, in a proposition (combining 2 and 4).

Example: Picketing vs (The workers)
(picket/picketed/will picket) (the factory).

Effect: Kress and Hodge (1979:27) argue that nominalization is ideological. Their discussion is summarized. Interest shifts from the participants and causers to the process (made nominal). The change from verb to noun entails a series of functional shifts. Specifically, process changes to state and activity to object. Also, speakers can avoid some of the classificatory acts (those indicating time when, relative likelihood, etc.) which are obligatory with verbs. Finally, a complex situation can be made to appear simple.

6. Relexicalization (Code 14)

Definition: The use of a nominalization, whose roles and tense cannot be recovered from context, as a role in another proposition.

Example: I know about the picketing vs I know that
(the workers) (are picketing/picketed/will picket) (the
factory).

Effect: It has the same effect as nominalization and, in addition, as Kress and Hodge (1979:29) argue, increases

the opacity of the final clause. Moreover, nominals function as roles rather than as acts, complex causes look like simple ones, and the functional/semantic inventory of the text has been altered. Therefore, the inventory of referents available to the text user has been modified.

Semantic SDDs

7. Abstraction (Code 20)

Definition: The use of roles and processes such that one can no longer tell the concrete objects and activities they refer to (cf. Hayakawa 1978).

Example: Joe squandered his wealth in Las Vegas vs Joe owned two cows, sold them, went to Las Vegas, and lost all the money gambling.

Effect: High levels of abstraction prevent any kind of meaningful understanding because they are, as Johnson (quoted in Hayakawa 1978:164) says, "words cut loose from their moorings."

8. Generalization (Code 21)

Definition: The use of roles and processes which are not specific enough (cf. Hayakawa 1978).

Example: Men are stupid vs John Doe is stupid.

Effect: The categories are so broad that details are lost.

9. Figurative language

Definition: The use of tropes (cf. Schofer and Rice 1977) and euphemisms, other than those established as clichés, in which words have meanings other than literal.

Example: John's a real genius vs John is an idiot.

Effect: Semantic reference is neither direct nor literal, thus misinterpretation is possible, especially if written and not spoken.

Types: a) metaphor (Code 22): "two normally unlike things are compared" (DeVito 1986:202) as in, for example, "The ship ploughed the seas."

b) metonymy (Code 23): "a name for one thing is substituted for something else with which it is closely associated" (DeVito 1986:202) as in, for example, "The White House" for "The President."

c) synecdoche (Code 24): "a part is substituted for the whole" (DeVito 1986:202) or vice versa as in, for example, "ten sails" for "ten ships."

d) hypallage (Code 25): "a modifier, appropriate to one noun, is transferred to another technically inappropriate noun" (DeVito 1986:151) as in, for example, "a cheerful morning."

e) irony (Code 26): "the real or intended is the opposite of the literal meaning" (DeVito 1986:171) as in, for example, "John's a real genius" for "John is an idiot."

- f) litotes (Code 27): an understatement, especially that in which an affirmative is expressed by the negative of its contrary (cf. DeVito 1986) as in, for example, "Not bad at all" for "Very good" or "King Kong was no small monkey" for "King Kong was a big monkey." This definition does not include some valid uses as in, for example, "Not infrequent" for "frequent."
- g) hyperbole (Code 28): an exaggeration or extravagant statement (cf. DeVito 1986) as in, for example, "I waited an eternity" or "I am so hungry I could eat a cow."
- h) personification (Code 29): "human characteristics are attributed to inanimate objects" (DeVito 1986:225) as in, for example, "This room cries for activity" or "My car is tired and wants a drink."
- i) euphemism (Code 30): "a polite, more pleasant expression used instead of some socially unacceptable form" (DeVito 1986:109) as in, for example, "There is a credibility gap" for "He is a liar."

Pragmatic SDDs

10. Indirect illocution

Definition: Any further illocution a sentence might have beyond the illocution most directly indicated by a

literal reading of the grammatical form and vocabulary of the sentence (cf. Hurford and Heasley 1983). This can also be done with certain "aesthetic adjectives" which, according to Richards (1929:336), "register the projection of a feeling into an object."

Examples: Why don't we go to the beach? (direct illocution: a question; indirect illocution: a suggestion) vs I suggest that we go to the beach (direct illocution: a suggestion; indirect illocution: none) or I believe you are looking for me (direct illocution: an assertion; indirect illocution: a question) vs Are you looking for me? (direct illocution: a question; indirect illocution: none).

Effect: Indirect illocution may confuse text users as to what the text producer is doing by producing the utterance.

Types: a) normativized description (Code 40):

a DES behind a NOR.

Example: "Notice that she is 6 feet tall"
versus "She is 6 feet tall"

b) descriptivized convention (Code 41):

a NOR behind a DES.

Example: "You should do that" versus "Do that"

c) normativized convention (Code 42):

a type of NOR behind another NOR.

Example: "Why don't you go" versus "I suggest you go"

d) subjectivized description (Code 43):

a DES behind a SUB.

Example: "I am glad he is here" versus
"He is here"

e) descriptivized expression (Code 44):

a SUB behind a DES.

Example: "This city is pleasant" versus
"I like this city" or "this city is
pleasant to me"

f) normativized expression (Code 45):

a SUB behind a NOR.

Example: "Notice that beautiful woman"
versus "I like that woman"

g) subjectivized convention (Code 46):

a NOR behind a SUB.

Example: "It is nice to do that" versus
"Do that"

11. Unacceptable claim (Code 47)

Definition: The use of the cultural validity claim uv (unaccepted values). Included here are linguistic practices, beliefs, norms, and values that give origin to speech acts that are not in use in a particular culture.

For instance, in this culture, it is common practice to provide the grounds and warrant in an argument so that people can accept or reject the conclusion.

Effect: Imposition of a particular point of view without a justification or explanation.

12. Speculative illocution (Code 50)

Definition: Weak commitment to the factuality of an assertion.

Example: John may/might be sick or I guess John is sick vs John is sick, John is not sick, or I don't know whether John is sick.

Effect: The framing of a statement as a speculative act (I think, I guess, I believe) rather than an assertive act (I state, I claim, I assert) leaves the text user free to believe or not.

In addition, epistemic pr (probability) and ps (possibility), and cognitive un (uncertainty) and bc (belief) are validity claims triggering this code.

13. Expressive illocution (Code 51)

Definition: The use of illocutions expressing affective or emotional states (joy, sorrow, fear, hate, and the like).

Example: I am glad to be here vs I am here.

Effect: The framing of a statement as an expressive act (I regret, I am glad, etc.) rather than as an assertive act (I claim, I state, etc.) tends to influence text users.

Although these illocutions can be statements of expressive acts, they still influence text users.

In addition, evaluative po (positive) and na (negative), and emotive jo (joy), sa (sadness), fe (fear), lo (love), and ha (hate) are validity claims triggering this code.

14. Ideational domination (Code 52)

Definition: A viewpoint that arises from the reality portrayed by an argumentative act.

Example: Women shouldn't have control over their bodies vs Women should have control over their bodies

Effect: It upholds an asymmetric power relationship.

15. Interpersonal domination (Code 53)

Definition: A viewpoint that arises from the interaction between a text producer and a text user in the context of an argumentative act and that is based on asymmetric power relationships.

It is used to code an argumentative act containing one or more of the following:

- lack of coding in the IL section of the tables
- code 40 (normativized description)
- code 41 (descriptivized convention)
- code 42 (normativized convention)
- code 43 (subjectivized description)
- code 44 (descriptivized expression)
- code 45 (normativized expression)
- code 46 (subjectivized convention)
- code 47 (unacceptable claim)
- code 50 (speculative illocution)
- code 51 (expressive illocution)

The reason why these SDDs indicate interpersonal domination has to do with the fact that text producers, when using these SDDs, are forcing text users to accept hidden,

unpresupposed messages via the power the text producer has over the text user.

In addition, the use of one of the deontic validity claims on (obligation not to perform), op (obligation to perform), or pp (permission to perform) also triggers code 53, if they are not backed up by valid reasons.

16. Textual distortion (Code 54)

Definition: The use of one or more SDDs.

It is used to encode an argumentative act containing one or more SDDs in the IL or LO sections of the tables, or the lack of coding in the IL section of the tables.

Argumentative SDDs

17. Logical fallacies

Definition: Flaws in the logic of an argument (cf. Hairston 1982) or, according to Fearnside (1980:5), "failure to conform to the rules that produce valid arguments."

Example: If Jane Doe is the President, then she is famous. She is famous. So, she is the President (affirming the hypothesis is invalid) vs If Jane Doe is the President, then she is famous. She is the President. So, she is famous (modus ponens is a valid procedure).

Effect: Deception.

Types: a) invalid categorical syllogism (Code 60).¹
 b) invalid hypothetical syllogism (Code 61).²
 c) invalid disjunctive syllogism (Code 62).³
 d) invalid alternative syllogism (Code 63).⁴

18. Material fallacies

Definition: Flaws in the content of an argument (cf. Hairston 1982) or, according to Fearnside (1980:36), "the urging of a conclusion on the basis of faulty or inadequate material."

Example: John Doe is not persuasive because he does not convince the audience to accept his ideas (this is an example of a circular argument, a definition used as a justification) vs John Doe is not persuasive because his arguments are invalid.

Effect: Deception.

Types: a) faulty analogy (Code 70): "a comparison of two situations that are essentially different" (Fearnside 1980:42) as in, for example, "You have fruit for breakfast; why not try Jell-O for breakfast?"

- b) false cause⁵ (Code 71): this fallacy is "taking the mere fact that one event precedes another in time as a sufficient proof of a causal relationship between the two events" (Fearnside 1980:39) as in, for example, "Permissive child rearing causes juvenile delinquency."
- c) loading the assertion⁶ (Code 72): this fallacy "describes the process of assuming in the premises of an argument what you

ought to be establishing by proof"
 (Hairston 1982:367) as in, for example,
 "This fine public servant deserves our
 support" or "This corrupt official
 should be thrown out of office."

- d) either/or fallacy⁷ (Code 73): this fallacy forces people "into choosing between two conflicting alternatives by suggesting that there are no other options" (Hairston 1982:371) as in, for example, "America--Love It or Leave It, Better Red than Dead, Better Dead than Red."
- e) complex question⁸ (Code 74): this fallacy "sets up a question in such a way that a direct answer can only support the questioner's assumption" (Hairston 1982:372) as in, for example, "Have you stopped beating your son?"
- f) misuse of hypothetical fact (Code 75): this fallacy "occurs when one represents as sure to happen an outcome of what is in truth a mere speculation" (Fearnside 1980:40) as in, for example, "If the incumbent senator had voted for the treaty, then he would have been re-elected."

g) oversimplification (Code 76): this fallacy "refers to reducing discussion of a complicated situation to simple descriptions that are inaccurate" (Fearnside 1980:55) as in, for example, "Hard work is the key to success" or "Freud teaches that everything is sex."

h) faulty generalization (Code 77): this fallacy "is formed without enough cases to support it . . . [or] on the basis of cases not typical of the whole area it covers" (Fearnside 1980:36) as in, for example, "Jews are all like that."

i) extension (Code 78): this fallacy extends the issue until the argument is on a different subject altogether (cf. Fearnside 1980) as in, for example, "If guns are outlawed, then outlaws will have guns."

j) circular argument (Code 79): this fallacy offers a restatement of its assertion as a reason for accepting it (cf. Hairston 1982) as in, for example, "Smoking is injurious because it harms the human body."

19. Psychological fallacies

Definition: These fallacies, according to Fearnside (1980:8), "mislead the audience by taking advantage of psychological factors."

Example: District Attorney Phillips wants to become famous prosecuting my client so he can run for governor (this is an example of personal attack, which leads to ignoring the issue).

Effect: Deception.

Types: a) personal attack⁹ (Code 80): this fallacy "seeks to discredit the source of the argument by charging personal shortcomings that are irrelevant to the issue to be decided" (Fearnside 1980:8) as in, for example, "Senator Doe favors resumption of the draft because he is too old to have to serve."

b) popular appeal¹⁰ (Code 81): this fallacy seeks "to win friends for an argument by playing upon the likes and dislikes of the audience" (Fearnside 1980:14) as in, for example, "the American way" when addressing a patriotic crowd.

c) appeal to ignorance¹¹ (Code 82): this fallacy asserts that "a claim or theory must be right because no one can prove that it is wrong" (Hairston 1982:375) as in, for example, "There is no way to disprove the existence of God; therefore He exists" or "There is no proof for the

existence of God; therefore He does not exist."

d) semantic argument¹² (Code 83): this fallacy "refers to the psychological distraction produced by the connotative suggestions of words" (Fearnside 1980:27), called "purr words", if they label a thing as good, and "snarl words", if bad (McDonald 1983:102). For example: "He is a dupe" or "He is authentic."

e) genetic fallacy (Code 84): this fallacy "asserts that we can predict a person's nature and character if we know that person's origins" (Hairston 1982:374). It can also be applied to institutions, things, and ideas. This fallacy can result in "guilt by association" (i.e., "He must be racist because he lived in South Africa") or "glory by association" (i.e., "He wouldn't do that because he is from a good family").

20. Tautology (Code 90)

Definition: "A statement whose falsity is logically impossible." (Pospesel 1974:158)

Example: Either John Doe is a democrat or he is not a democrat.

Effect: It is absolutely true but conveys no relevant factual information, unless used as part of a larger argument.

21. Contingent falsity¹³ (Code 91)

Definition: "A statement whose truth (or falsity) is not a matter of logic but is dependent or contingent on the way the world is actually structured." (Pospesel 1974:162)

Example: The sun is the earth's natural satellite.

Effect: Deception.

22. Contradiction (Code 92)

Definition: "A statement whose truth is logically impossible." (Pospesel 1974:160)

Example: John Doe is a democrat and he is not a democrat.

Effect: Deception, unless used to disprove an invalid argument.

23. Countercriticism¹⁴ (Code 93)

Definition: Countercriticism, according to Fogelin (1982:48), "occurs when we are dealing with facts that point in different directions" or want to block what we see as negative implication of what we have said.

Example: The situation is difficult, but not hopeless
or The ring is beautiful, but expensive.

Effect: Text producers discount the fact that goes against their position (that the ring is beautiful is a reason for buying it) by enhancing the one that favors theirs (that the ring is expensive is a reason for not

buying it). The result of this process is deception and, in addition, confusion.

24. Unstated premiss (Code 94)

Definition: A premiss that cannot be recovered from context, thus, leaving the conclusion of an argumentative act without warrant and/or grounds.

Effect: The text user has no basis for accepting or rejecting the conclusion of an argument.

25. Unwarranted conclusion (Code 95)

Definition: A conclusion whose premisses cannot be recovered from context or whose premisses contain unwarranted assumptions. This code will not be used when a premiss has been reconstructed.

Effect: The text user has no basis for rejecting or accepting the conclusion of an argument.

26. Unwarranted assumption (Code 96)

Definition: A faulty assumption whose source, according to Hairston (1982:187), is the "common habit of attributing our own values to other people."

Example: "Women don't mind getting paid less than men for the same work because women are interested in pocket money only."

Effect: The text user is forced to accept an unwarranted conclusion as a premiss. In other words, it must be proved that, using the example, that is what women actually want.

A Definition for ISA

With the discussion of the levels of ISA serving as a background, it is important now to develop a definition of ISA which will serve as a guideline for this dissertation. ISA is a technique for uncovering ideologies by systematically and objectively identifying specific SDDs in texts.

A Typical Research Design for ISA

Unlike some types of content analysis, whose categories vary from study to study depending upon each study's particular problem, ideological structure analysis--a very specialized type of content analysis--comes equipped with its categories--that is, its SDDs.

The research plan, I propose, for a typical ISA has the following stages:

1. The investigator formulates the research question, theory, and hypotheses.
2. The investigator selects a sample.
3. The investigator reads (or listens to) and codes the content according to ISA procedures. At this time intercoder reliability is determined.
4. The investigator arrives at scores.
5. The investigator interprets the findings according to appropriate concepts or theories.

The important point here is that ISA provides its own categories. Therefore, the results of one study can be compared with those of another.

Notes

1. The rules for categorical syllogisms and their possible flaws are, according to Fearnside (1980:103):

- a) There must be exactly three terms, each used exactly twice.
(Violation of this rule is the fallacy of four terms.)
An example of this fallacy taken from Fearnside (1980:96) is:
All steel construction is erected by union workers.
That building is of wood construction.
No conclusion possible
- b) There must be either no exclusion or two exclusions, one of which must appear in the conclusion.
(Violation of this rule is the fallacy of faulty exclusions.)
An example of this fallacy taken from Fearnside (1980:98) is:
State employees are excluded from this insurance plan.
We are not state employees.
No conclusion possible
- c) The middle term must be distributed at least once.
(Violation of this rule is the fallacy of the undistributed middle.)
An example of this fallacy taken from Fearnside (1980:99) is:
All police chiefs favor gun control.
All sheriffs favor gun control.
So, all sheriffs are police chiefs.
- d) Any term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premise where it appears.
(Violation of this rule is the fallacy of illicit distribution.)
An example of this fallacy taken from Fearnside (1980:100) is:
All pesticides are damaging to the ecology.
Some poisons are not pesticides.
So, some poisons are not damaging to the ecology.

2. Breaking the rules of hypothetical syllogisms results, according to Fearnside (1980:138), in the following fallacious examples:

- a) Fallacy of denying the antecedent.
If it rains, then the river will rise.
It will not rain.
Therefore, the river will not rise.
- b) Fallacy of affirming the consequent.
If it rains, then the river will rise.
The river is rising.
Therefore, it rained.

- c) Fallacy of uncertain relationship between the premises.

If it rains, then the river will rise.

The weather forecast is for rain.

No conclusion possible

- d) Fallacy of unauthorized conclusion.

If the bell rings, then it will be Jane's date.

The bell is ringing.

So, Jane will have a wonderful time.

3. According to Fearnside (1980:146), breaking the rule ("one must affirm one disjunct") results in the fallacy of failing to affirm a disjunct as in, for example:

Not both Jones goes hunting and Jones goes to the circus.

Jones is not going hunting.

No conclusion possible. This is an example of de

Morgan's theorem (Sullivan's personal communication).

4. According to Fearnside (1980:147), breaking the rule ("one must deny one alternate") results in the fallacy of failing to deny an alternate as in, for example:

Either the light bulb is broken or the current is off.

The current is off.

So, the light bulb is broken.

This is an example of de Morgan's theorem

(Sullivan's personal communication).

5. This is also known as post hoc, ergo propter hoc.

6. This is also known as "begging the question."

7. This is also called "undistributed middle fallacy" or "black-or-white fallacy."

8. This is also known as "leading question" and includes other examples such as "You wouldn't go to the library, would you?", "Where did you take your date before you went home?", "Is it going to be cash or check?" (asked before one decides to buy), or "Don't let the court coddle criminals." Examples taken from Fearnside (1980:53-54).

9. This is also called argumentum ad hominem or "argument to the person."

10. This is also called argumentum ad populum or "argument to the people."

11. This is also known as argumentum ad ignorantiam.

12. This is also known as "emotive language" or "colored words."

13. This is also called violation of natural law.
14. This is also called "discounting."

CHAPTER IV METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

This chapter presents the details of an actual ideological structure analysis.

Overview of the Chapter

In the sections that follow are (1) a description of the data collected, (2) a statement of the hypothesis upon which the study is based, (3) an outline of the ISA procedures used, (4) the analysis of the ten texts, and (5) the results.

Data Collection

The data for this study consist of ten press commentaries written by syndicated columnists on the topic of federal funds for elective abortions in June/July 1977 as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on these matters on June 20, 1977. These commentaries or columns appeared, at one time or another, in major newspapers throughout the United States. Five writers opposed this decision (Group A) and another five defended it (Group B). The ten articles were chosen from a list of 34 columnists, cartoonists, and TV/radio commentators, whose responses dealt with the topic from perspectives spanning the political spectrum.

The articles were reprinted in Viewpoint: America's Syndicated Journalists on File (volume 2, 1977), published by the Microfilm Corporation of America.

From this original list of 34 I eliminated 8 cartoonists, 2 radio commentators, 1 TV commentator, and 2 female columnists. This avoided the introduction of variables based on sex and medium and left a total of 21 male columnists: 16 opposed the decision and 5 favored it. The five writers in favor of the Supreme Court decision were included in their totality. The five writers against the decision were chosen from the remaining 16 by random number assignment. The results of this process are included in Table 1.

Table 1
Selected Texts and Their Identifying Numbers

Number	Texts
A1	Tom Braden. The Narrowness of "Necessary," Los Angeles Times Syndicate, released July 7, 1977.
A2	David S. Broder. (No title), The Washington Post Writers Group, released July 20, 1977.
A3	Ernest B. Furgurson. Following "Right-to-Life" Logic, Los Angeles Times Syndicate, released July 10, 1977.
A4	Carl T. Rowan. The "Born Again" Anti-Abortionist, Field Newspaper Syndicate, released July 22, 1977.
A5	Tom Wicker. Kitchen-Table Justice, <u>The New York Times</u> , June 28, 1977, p. 31.
B1	William F. Buckley, Jr. The Court on Abortion, Washington Star Syndicate, Inc., released June 25, 1977.
B2	James J. Kilpatrick. Buy Me a Printing Press?, Washington Star Syndicate, Inc., released July 2, 1977.
B3	William Raspberry. (No title), The Washington Post Writers Group, released July 1, 1977.
B4	William A. Rusher. New Light on Abortion Rights, Universal Press Syndicate, released July 6, 1977.
B5	George F. Will. (No title), The Washington Post Writers Group, released June 23, 1977.

The 10 texts were typed as they appear in the original copy released by the syndicates to which the writers belong and are provided in the appendices. The texts resulted in a corpus of 295 sentences and 7,025 words. This information is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2
Number of Words and Sentences in the Texts

Text	Number of Words	Number of Sentences
Group A	3,538	126
A1	674	23
A2	830	31
A3	616	26
A4	607	21
A5	811	25
Group B	3,487	169
B1	606	38
B2	702	40
B3	803	44
B4	688	22
B5	688	25
	-----	-----
Total	7,025	295
	-----	-----

The average number of sentences was 25 for Group A, 34 for Group B, and 29 for both groups. Likewise, the average number of words was 707 for Group A, 697 for Group B, and 702 for both groups.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that there is a specific set of ideological mechanisms for the writers of Group A and a different one for those of Group B. The study was designed to gauge the precise nature of any set that may be present within each of the 10 texts.

Procedure

Chapter I included a brief look at ideological structure analysis. It outlined the basic nature of the method. This section is more detailed.

Ideological Structure Analysis

Ideological structure analysis, as developed in this study, depends on textual organization. The following outline on the structuring of argumentative acts, speech acts, and method is intended to provide an adequate grasp of the subject.

Dimensions of textual organization. Text production, whether spoken or written, is, according to Winterowd (1983:82), the "ability to combine propositions." One of the main problems in analyzing a text, according to Ferrara (1985:142), is "how we go from the unbroken linearity of its surface manifestation to the identification of clusters of hierarchically organized speech acts." Given the argumentative nature of the texts of this study, I propose that such organization be carried out by the macrostructure of the act of argumentation. Argumentative acts contribute to textual organization by grouping potentially unrelated speech acts as either warrants, grounds, or conclusions. Argumentation does not seem possible with facts or subjective expressions alone (cf. Hairston 1982). However, given the mixed nature of the texts used in this study, such descriptive facts and subjective expressions are, more often than not, included as a part of an argumentative act.

Furthermore, the argumentative act is made up of speech acts. A speech act may contain propositions about:

- 1) the illocutionary act ("I state")
- 2) the validity claim ("John told me")

3) the locutionary act ("Mary arrived")

4) the perlocutionary act ("I want you to know")

The structuring of any speech act is a process of proposition-combining. Given the fact that all propositions, except locutionary propositions, may be implicit, the locutionary proposition is the core around which the argumentative act with its speech acts is organized.

The locutionary, or core, proposition is an independent, primitive proposition that can stand on its own. It occupies the L0 column in the tables used for the analysis of the texts. In addition, locutionary propositions may be part of descriptive, normative, or subjective linguistic acts. Accordingly, two propositions that are part of the same illocutionary act are of the same type, while those of different types of acts may be of different types. Likewise, two locutionary propositions may have the same (both are independent) or different (one is independent, the other is dependent on the first) status. Finally, the relationship between two propositions can be signaled by any of the connectives discussed in Chapter II.

Consequently, the structuring of any speech act will be done in the following way:

1. We determine the number of argumentative acts in the text.

2. We determine whether each argumentative act is in its expanded form or is an enthymeme.

3. We determine what speech act or speech acts go with

each part of the argumentative act and, in the case of enthymemes, what possible speech acts are missing.

4. We determine what propositions are available (present in the text) and establish the default values for the others--that is, recover the missing propositions.

The method. The methodology rests on the assumption that language as a social act must indicate:

1. An explicit or implicit manifestation of:
 - a. the argumentative act (the macroIL),
 - b. the illocutionary acts and their validity claims (the microIL),
 - c. the perlocutionary act and its claim;
2. An explicit manifestation of:
 - d. a set of referring expressions (the locutionary act).

So, in order to analyze sentences like John didn't go to work because he was sick, we must postulate a minimum of three speech acts embedded in each of the three elements (warrant, grounds, and conclusion) of an argumentative act:

1. warrant = (speech act = illocutionary act, validity claim, and locution)

"I assert, I base my assumption on an accepted cultural norm, People who are sick don't go to work"

2. grounds = (speech act = illocutionary act, validity claim, and locution)

"I state, I was told by John, John was sick"

3. conclusion = (speech act = illocutionary act, validity claim, and locution)

"I state, I know, John didn't go to work"

4. the overall argument = (perlocutionary act = ideational ideology, interpersonal ideology, and validity claim)

"I convey ideational solidarity and interpersonal neutrality via textual clarity"

In addition, ISA involves two separate stages. The first stage requires the identification and isolation of the above elements. Arbitrary abbreviations and symbols (see Key to Abbreviations and Symbols, p. x) are then substituted for each element, except for the implicit and explicit locutions.

The second stage involves the identification and coding of those elements which contain SDDs.

This Study

On the following pages is a table for each of the 10 texts analyzed in the study. Table 15, on page 124, shows the results for Group A. Table 16, on page 125, shows the results for Group B.

Each text was assigned an identifying number. The list of texts and the numbers assigned to them is included in Table 1 on page 62. The original columns appear in the Appendices (pp. 134-173).

RN	AR	IL		LO	PE	CO
SN SE AN TY VC TY VC					TY VC TY	
	1 ar wa	(x)	(94)			
	gr	(x)	(94)		(78)	
1 1	co as 47	Powell is a kindly man(95) (78)	in			
	+					aa
2	as 47	Powell is an intelligent man(95)	53 54			
	+					ao
	2 ar wa as 47	[Supreme Court justices who (96) argue that (a) put their countries in terrible jams]				
	gr st fc	[Powell argued that (a)]				
3	co as 47	Powell has put his country into a terrible jam (95)	in 53 54			
	+					aa
	3 ar wa as 47	[People who argue that (a) don't foresee the consequences of their thoughts] (96)				
	gr st fc	[Powell argued that (a)]				
4	co 50 47	He didn't foresee the consequen- ces of his thought (95)	in 53 54			
	+					aa
	4 ar wa 50 av	[It must seem perfect logic to people to argue that (p)]				
	gr st fc	[Powell argued that (p)]				
2 5	co 50 47	It must have seemed perfect lo- gic to him to argue that (p)	in 53 54			
	+					aa
	5 ar wa as av	[People who point out that (p) show their logic]				
3 6	gr st fc	Powell pointed out that (p) (p=part of sentence 3				
	+	p=sentence 4)				aa
4			in			
5 7	co as av	That is Powell's logic	pn tc			
	+					aa

Table 3--continued

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY
8	8	6	ar	wa	ad	op	Supreme Court justices have an obligation to a larger and social view				
6	9		gr	st	fc		[Powell's logic doesn't show it]				
			co	as	47		The trouble with the logic is its terrible narrowness (95)				
7	10				+						aa
			st	fc			It restricts itself to the medical definition of "necessary"				
9	11				+						ai
			as	av			What is "unnecessary" from a doctor's standpoint may be very necessary from the standpoint of the country				
									in	53	54
					+						aa
			7	ar	wa	as	av	[Supreme Court justices who say (p) make the distinction with facts and figures]			
11	12		gr	st	fc		Marshall said that (p)				
					+						aa
12	13				st	fc	Marshall said that (p)				
					+						aa
13	14				st	fc	Marshall said that (p)				
10	15		co	st	fc		In the argument in which the court engaged, the only man who made this distinction and made it with facts and figures was Marshall				
									in	pn	tc
					+						aa
			8	ar	wa	ad	47	[People who view the result (p) should be heeded] (96)			
			gr	st	fc		[Marshall views the result (p)]				
14	16		co	or	47		Heed Marshall's view of the result (p) (95)				
									in	53	54
					+						ao
			9	ar	wa	ad	av	[Supreme Court justices should advert to all the deprivations which will be suffered by the rest of us]			

Table 3--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	
										aa	
	12	ar	wa	ad	av	[If they are leading us to more welfare, more crime, and more demands for abortion, reject their views]					
19	22		gr	as	tr	They are leading us to more welfare, more crime in the streets, and as a matter of fact, as soon as the unwanted children grow to puberty, more demands for abortion					
			co	or	av	[Reject their views]					
										is pn tc	
										aa	
20	23	13	aa	wa	ad	av	The question of abortion is one to be decided by the mother (and father) and the doctor				
			gr	as	tr	[The Supreme Court decision gives this right to some mothers but not to others]					
			co	or	av	[Reject the Supreme Court decision]					
										is pn tc	
										aa	
	14	aa	wa	ad	av	[The decision to abort should not depend on money and should be made freely]					
21	24		gr	as	tr	The ruling permits this decision to be freely made by those who can afford it while withholding that freedom from those who cannot					
			co	or	av	[The Supreme Court decision is unfair]					
										is pn tc	
										ao	
	15	ar	wa	ad	av	[If these points in the argument about abortion have been sufficiently stressed, then other arguments should be accepted]					

Table 3--continued

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO			
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC					TY	VC	TY	
22	25		gr	as	tr	These points have been made time and again								
			co	or	av	[You should accept the argument that I'm about to present]							in	
											pn	tc		
+												aa		
		16	ar	wa	ad	av	[If the interest of women has been sufficiently stressed, then the interest of society should be stressed]							
			gr	as	tr	[The funding of abortions is only a minor problem]								
23	26		co	as	tr	What has not been sufficiently stressed in the argument about abortion is the interest of the rest of us, that is, of the country as a whole							52	
											pn	tc		

Table 4
Analysis of Text A2

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO				
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC	TY					VC	TY		
1	1	1	ar	wa	as	47	Most politicians who were on their way up in the early 60s have a well-developed case of Kennedy envy (96)								
			gr	st	fc		[Carter was on his way up in the early 60s]								
		2		co	as	47	Carter has a well-developed case in of Kennedy envy (95) (78)						53	54	
+												aa			
2	3	2	ar	wa	as	av	It turns up in everything (28) from his hairdo to his speech								
3	4		gr	st	fc		Carter was pressed for his views on the equity of recent abortions decisions by Congress and the Supreme Court								
		5		co	51	fc	Carter fell back on Kennedy's famous observation that "life is unfair"						in		
+												aa			
			3	ar	wa	as	av	[Reporters who want to know a VIP's opinion about the legislative and judicial actions against Medicaid payments for abortion can ask them about it]							
			gr	st	fc		[Woodruff wanted to do so]						in		
4	6		co	st	fc		Woodruff asked question (p)						pn	tc	
+												aa			
			4	ar	wa	as	av	[VIPs who are asked question (p) can reply]							
			gr	st	fc		[Carter was asked question (p)]						in		
5	7		co	st	fc		Carter replied (p)						pn	tc	
+												aa			
7	8	5	ar	wa	st	fc	Kennedy's "life is unfair" was a response to the								

Table 4--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
							complaints of Army Reservists mobilized during the Berlin crisis			
8	9		gr	st	fc		Carter was talking about the 350,000 poor women--one third of them teenagers--who last year sought government aid in ending unwanted, sometimes dangerous, pregnancies			
6	10		co	as	tr		Carter did more than borrow Kennedy's words	pn		
					+					aa
11			as	tr			He wrenched them out of context	in	to	
					+					aa
9	12	6	ar	wa	as	47	A nation--or a President--that cannot distinguish between the inevitable inequities in a military mobilization and the deliberate decision to deny help to a pregnant teenager is a nation which has lost its way (96)			
			gr	as	tr		[The U.S.--or Carter--did not distinguish between these two things]			
			co	as	47		[The U.S. has lost its way](95)	is	53	54
					+					aa
10	13	7	ar	wa	st	fc	Some members of the House who argued unsuccessfully against the Hyde amendment, which denies federal funds for abortion, even in the case of incest or rape or to save the mother's life, tried to say just that			
11	14		gr	st	fc		Mitchell told of visiting a patient at a hospital for the mentally ill, the victim of a rape case who went through an illegal back-alley abortion			
					+					aa
12	15		st	fc			He said that (p)			

Table 4--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
				co	st	fc	[Mitchell argued unsuccessfully]	is		
								pn	tc	
										ao
13	15	8	ar	wa	as	tr	Other members of the House who found it as easy as Carter to dismiss the concern about "discrimination against the poor" were not so sympathetic			
14	16		gr	as	tr		Rudd, few of whose constituents need help from the government, found it as easy as Carter to dismiss the concern about "discrimination against the poor"	is		
				co	as	tr	[Rudd was not so sympathetic]	pn	tc	
										aa
				9	ar	wa	as	tr		
							[Sexist and racist comments cause certain women to make certain remarks]			
15	17		gr	st	fc		Rudd said that (p)			
							+			aa
16	18			st	fc		Rudd said that (p)			
17	19		co	as	tr		It was such comments as these that caused Holtzman to remark that the Hyde amendment would not prevail if the House had 417 women and 18 men, instead of the reverse, as is the case today	is		
								pn	tc	
										aa
20	20	10	ar	wa	as	tr	The social consequences of unwanted, uncared-for children are felt by everyone (28), not just their mothers (21)			
		21	gr	st	fc		Holtzman's district was one of those ravaged by looters in the New York blackout			
			co	as	tr		[The social consequences of the New York looting were felt by everyone] (61)			

Table 4--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
										aa
										aa
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Table 5
Analysis of Text A3

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY	
			1	ar	wa	as	av	[If a lobby mortally scares (p) and bluffs (p), then there is jubilation among the single-minded "right-to-life" lobby, the lobby is ready to concentrate on the 50 state legislatures, and its cheerleaders in print and politics celebrate its string of victories over the "pro-abortion" villains]				
2	1			gr	as	tr		The lobby has mortally scared the White House, the House of Representatives and the Senate				
3	2				+	as	tr	It has bluffed the Supreme Court into rendering the court's own 1973 decision on abortion rights essentially meaningless for those Americans most desperately concerned				
1	3			co	as	tr		There is jubilation among the single-minded "right-to-life" lobby				
4	4				+	as	tr	It is ready now to concentrate on the 50 state legislatures				
5	5				+	as	tr	Its cheerleaders in print and politics are celebrating its string of victories over the "pro-abortion" villains (who by repeated public opinion surveys constitute most of the republic)	is		ps	tc
					+							aa
			2	ar	wa	as	av	[It is logical for politicians who are pro-poor to prove it by voting in favor of the use of public money to pay for abortions]				
6	6			gr	as	av		Some politicians who have made a career of opposing every dollar of aid to poor Americans have discovered that they are				

Table 5--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	
							actually pro-poor, pro-black, pro-Latin				
7	7				+						aa
			as	tr			They prove it by voting against the use of public money to pay for abortions				
8	8		co	as	tr		As logic goes, it is indeed cir- cuitous	is		pn	tc
					+						ao
10	9	3	ar	wa	as	tr	[Logic (p) is hard to follow]				
			gr	as	tr		The warning (10) from the House floor rings (p)				
11	10				+						aa
			st	fc			A "right-to-life" columnist adds (p)	in			
9	11		co	or	av		Try to follow logic (p)	pn	54		
					+						aa
		4	ar	wa	as	av	[The use of the word "victims" for women who volunteer to end their unwanted pregnancies is inappropriate]				
12	12		gr	40	fc		They use the word "victims"				
13	13				+						aa
			st	fc			By definition, victims are not volunteers, as are all the women who opt to end unwanted pregnancies				
			co	as	av		[The use of "victims" is inappropriate]	in	53	54	
					+						aa
		5	ar	wa	as	av	[People who use words with emotional connotation as if were standard usage abuse language]				
14	14		gr	as	av		"Victim" has a nice emotional connotation and is standard usage				

Table 5--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
										aa
15	15				+					
					as	av	So is the adjective "pro-abortion," when the plurality of Americans consistently shown to favor tolerant laws on the subject is no more pro-abortion than it is pro-appendectomy			
					co	as	av	["Right-to-life" people abuse the language]	is	
										pn tc
										aa
										aa
16	16	6	ar	wa	as	av	People who believe in a woman's right to decide with her physician what course she will take, without the interference of others who have no personal stake in that decision, are pro-choice			
					gr	as	tr	[There are people who believe solis		
					co	as	av	[They are pro-choice]	pn	tc
										aa
										aa
					7	ar	wa	as	av	[If institutions say that women have no freedom of choice and that federal funds should not be used for abortion, then they produce sexist and class legislation]
17	17		gr	st	fc		The court and the Congress have not come right out and said women have no freedom of choice			
										aa
18	18				+					
					st	fc	They said that federal programs that pay for every other medical service should not be used for this one			
					co	as	av	[The court and the Congress produced class legislation](61)	is	
										pn 54
										aa
										aa
					8	ar	wa	as	av	[People who justify class legislation by saying that they are doing the poor a favor are not truthful]

Table 5--continued

RN				AR		IL		LO				PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC					TY	VC	TY		
19	19			gr	as	av	To justify this clear class legislation, the most ingenious logicians among them have announced that they are doing the poor a favor								
				co	as	av	[These people are not truth-ful]				is		pn tc		

				+					aa						

			9	ar	wa	ad	av	[People who were opposed to this reasoning said things that are useful to recall]							
21	20			gr	st	fc	Marshall said (p)								
							+				aa				
22	21				st	fc	Marshall said (p)								
							+				aa				
23	22				st	fc	Stokes said (p)								
							+				aa				
24	23				st	fc	Rowan said (p)								
20	24			co	ad	av	It is useful to recall what some of the blacks said				is		pn tc		

				+					aa						

			10	ar	wa	as	av	[People who suffer the consequences of the court and Congress on this and other issues are victims]							
25	25			gr	as	av	Those imposing this burden are the same ones who slash welfare funds, rave about crime and show contempt for their victims								
26	26			co	as	av	This time, the word "victim is used precisely. (63)				is		pn 54		

RN			AR		IL		LO			PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC				TY	VC	TY
			1	ar	wa	as	47	[People who run for office and use "born again" (83) religiosity bother voters] (96)				
1	1			gr	as	tr		Carter was struggling to win the Democratic nomination, and then the presidency and used "born again" religiosity				
			2		co	as	47	Almost nothing about him bothered more Americans than this religiosity (95)			in	53 54
+												aa
			2	ar	wa	41	47	[Presidents who talk to God do not listen to mortal advisors]				
2	3			gr	41	47		Carter was constantly talking to God (95)				
				co	as	av		He did not listen to any mortal advisor			in	53 54
+												aa
2	4	3	ar	wa	as	av		Presidents who bring a self-righteous arrogance to the Oval Office make their followers afraid				
3	5			gr	st	fc		Carter has not been proselytizing the American people				
								+				aa
4	6			as	tr			He has neither bored nor angered Americans with gawkish display of piety (95)				
2	7			co	cg	kn		Many Democrats expressed silly fears (78)			in	pn 54
+												aa
			4	ar	wa	as	av	[Presidents who let their religious biases take precedence over the national interest lay themselves open to criticism]				
5	8			gr	as	av		Carter's anti-abortion declarations contained religious biases				

Table 6--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
9			co	as	av	He did lay himself vulnerable (sic)		in	pn	tc
										aa
										aa
5	ar	wa	as	av		[Presidential declarations which contain religious biases are against the national interest]				
10			gr	as	av	Carter's anti-abortion declarations contain religious biases				
11			co	as	av	Carter's remarks on abortion are against the national interest		is	pn	tc
										aa
										aa
6	ar	wa	as	av		[If men declare that God is a man, then they will stir a mini-revolt among some women]				
6	12		gr	as	47	Carter feels sure that God is a man				
13			co	as	tr	He stirred a mini-revolt among top-level women in his administration				
										aa
7	14		st	fc		From bureaus and agencies all over this town they flocked to the White House to protest their President's opposition to using federal Medicaid funds to finance abortions for poor women		is	53	54
										aa
										aa
7	ar	wa	as	av		[Women who revolt against Carter's abortion stand and don't need Medicaid for abortions deserve applause]				
			gr	st	fc	[Women in the Carter administration revolted against his abortion stand]				
										aa
8	15		st	fc		All of these women are affluent enough not to need Medicaid				

Table 6--continued

RN				AR				IL				LO				PE				CO			
SN		SE		AN		TY		VC		TY		VC		TY		VC		TY					
money for abortions or anything else																							
16				co		41		51		Applaud these women officials						is		53		54			
+																							
aa																							
8		ar		wa		as		47		[Public policy stands dictated by Church dogma are bad] (96)													
9		17		gr		as		47		Carter's abortion stand is dictated by Church dogma (95)										is			
				co		as		47		[Carter's abortion stand is bad]										53		54	
+																							
aa																							
9		ar		wa		as		av		[Public policy stands dictated by Church dogma are bound to to be protested]													
18				gr		st		fc		They were protesting													
19				co		as		av		Carter took an abortion stand dictated by Church dogma										is		pn	
+																							
aa																							
10		ar		wa		as		av		[Administration women who see their President clinging to certain ideas will want to hear Carter's explanation]													
10		20		gr		as		av		They saw their leader clinging to the notion that a woman's body is not her own, and that if someone gets her pregnant she is morally bound to have the baby													
11										+												aa	
										Even if she's a 14-year-old whose life will be wrecked; even if she's so emotionally disturbed that having another baby will push her into a mental institution; even if the odds are high that the baby will be mongoloid, born with sickle cell anemia, deformed by the mother's German measles													
12		21		co		as		kn		The women in the Carter administration want to hear his													

Table 6--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
						<p>explanation as to how he decided it is "moral" to draw the line on Medicaid abortions only in cases of rape, incest and when the mother's life is at stake</p>				
						is pn tc				
						+				
						aa				
11	ar	wa	as	av	[People who don't know can ask]					
	gr	cg	lk		[I don't know how Carter ruled out the other cases]					
13	22		co	ak	av	How did he rule out the other cases, the ones I mentioned above?				
						is pn tc				
						+				
						aa				
14	23	12	ar	wa	as	av	It is easy to draw such lines when they apply only to the poorest, least vocal, politically least powerful women in the land			
15	24		gr	pe	av	Affluent women who paid for more than 700,000 abortions last year won't be penalized by the President's imposition of personal morality				
25			co	as	av	It is easy to penalize only the the 300,000 poor women who could get safe abortions only because Medicaid money made it possible				
						is pn tc				
						+				
						aa				
13	ar	wa	as	av	[The justification of an anti-abortion stand with certain observations is outrageous to women]					
16	26		gr	st	fc	Carter justified this with a profound observation that (p)				
						+				
17	27			st	fc	He went on to assert that (p)				
16	28		co	in	ho	The women of the Carter administration are also outraged				
						is pn tc				

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY	
			+								aa	
14			ar	wa	as	av	[Women who don't know can ask]					
			gr	as	kn	[The protesting women don't know]						
18	29		co	st	fc	The protesting women are asking how a President who campaigned as a populist, a friend of the little guy, could now be saying, in effect, (p)		is		pn tc		
			+								aa	
19	30	15	ar	wa	as	av	It is not government's responsibility to make results, or even rewards, equal for every citizen's endeavors, but in a democratic society it must be the government's duty to make opportunities as equal as is humanly possible					
			gr	as	tr	[Federal funds for abortion is one such opportunity]						
			co	ad	av	[It is the government's duty to provide federal funds for abortion]		is		pn tc		
			+								aa	
16			ar	wa	ad	av	[Presidents who know this principle and abandon it can be asked why they did it]					
20	31		gr	50	be	Carter knows this						
			+								ao	
			as	av	[He abandoned it]							
21	32		co	50	av	The women in his top echelon can find out why he did it		is		53 54		

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY	
1	1	1	ar	wa	as	av	A supreme court that rules in					
&							such a way that your financial					
2							status determines whether you					
							get an abortion advances the					
							the cause of inequity, poverty,					
							and misery					
3	2		gr	st	fc		The Supreme Court ruled so					
4	3		co	as	av		With the support of all three					
							branches of government, triumph					
							inequity, poverty, misery, the					
							welfare culture and the					
							billions of tax dollars it		is			
							annually consumes		pn	tc		

+-----												
aa												

			2	ar	wa	as	av	[A congress that adopts a ban				
							on the use of Medicaid, when a					
							federal court set aside enfor-					
							cement of this ban, takes a					
							strange course]					
5	4		gr	st	fc		Congress last year adopted					
							a ban on the the use of					
							Medicaid funds for elective					
							abortions, those not under-					
							taken for therapeutic					
							reasons					
+-----												
6	5		st	fc			A Federal Court, acting on what					aa
							it and everyone else thought					
							was the Supreme Court's					
							guarantee of the right to an					
							abortion in a 1973 decision,					
							set aside enforcement of this					
							ban until its constitutionality					
							could be tested		in			
			co	as	av		[Congress took a strange course]		pn	tc		

+-----												
aa												

			3	ar	wa	as	av	[Institutions that are				
							encouraged by VIP's comments					
							do things that are not					
							expected]					
7	6		gr	st	fc		Enter the Carter Administration,					
							in the person of Califano					

Table 7--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
										aa
8	7				+	st fc	He said he would not support the use of Federal funds for abortions, and President Carter backed him up			
9	8			co	50	av	Owing to that encouragement, this year the House of Representatives went even further than Congress had last year; it passed a ban on the use of Medicaid funds for any kind of abortion, even to save the life of a mother			
10	9				+	st fc	At that point last week, the Supreme Court acted on cases from Connecticut and Pennsylvania, ruling that (p)			aa
11	10				+	st fc	The next day, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the House ban on Medicaid abortions but amended it to permit therapeutic abortions required by threats to the physical well-being of the mother or the child after birth or both	is	53 54	aa
										aa
										aa
12	11			4	ar	wa as tr	[A provision that does (p) is against poor women]			
				gr	as	av	This provision, which apparently is about all that can be hoped for in the Senate, coincides with the Supreme Court ruling in that it guarantees affluent or middle-class women the right to abortions on demand, while preventing the use of Government funds to pay for elective abortions for women who cannot otherwise pay for them			
				co	as	av	[This provision is against poor women]	is	pn	tc

Table 7--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO		
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	VC	
						+	aa					
13	12	5	ar	wa	as	av	Poor women must either have their babies, at even greater cost to the taxpayers, or seek out some fly-by-night amateur for a kitchen-table abortion					
			gr	as	av		[Either option is not acceptable]					
			co	ad	av		[We must provide federal funds for abortions]	is	pn	tc		
						+	aa					
14	13	6	ar	wa	as	av	A person's moral and ethical views on the larger question of abortion are supportable					
			gr	st	fc		[The Court and Congress are not individuals] (61)					
		14	co	as	av		The situation wrought by Court and Congress is insupportable	is	pn	54		
						+	aa					
			7	ar	wa	as	av	[A situation where a right guaranteed to the rich is denied to the poor discriminates against the poor]				
15	16		gr	st	fc		The situation guarantees a right to the rich which is denied in practice to the poor					
		17	co	as	tr		It plainly discriminates against a class	is	pn	tc		
						+	aa					
			8	ar	wa	as	av	[Discrimination is most often felt by black women] (91)				
			gr	as	47		[Most women who abort are black]					
16	18		co	pe	av		That discrimination will be most often felt by black women in the city ghettos, those very "welfare mothers" against whom the righteous wrath of the comfortable and the calloused (sic) is so often directed	is	53	54		

Table 7--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	
	12	ar	wa	ad	av		[If VIPs criticize the ban on Medicaid funds for abortion, then we should do so too]				
21	23		gr	st	fc		Brooke said that (p)				
											aa
22	24			st	fc		Blackmun said that (p)	is			
			co	ad	av		[We should criticize it too]	pn	tc		
											aa
	13	ar	wa	as	av		[If the figures that support the criticisms of the VIPs are impressive, then the figures are equally depressing]				
24	25		gr	st	fc		Medicaid funds have paid for abortions for as many as 300,000 women a year, at a total cost of \$50 million				
											aa
25	26			st	fc		Sixty percent of the nation's 1.1 million abortions a year are performed in clinics for the poor--and only 29 percent in those private hospitals in which the Supreme Court absolutely guarantees the right of a woman who can afford it to an abortion on demand				
23	27		co	as	av		The figures that support him are as depressing as they are impressive	is			
								pn	tc		

Table 8
Analysis of Text B1

RN				AR				IL				LO				PE				CO			
SN				SE				AN				TY				VC				TY			
1				1				1				ar				wa				50			

Table 8--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
<hr/>										
		5	ar	wa	50	47	[Abortion could have been used to get rid of the the NY Times editorialist] (96)			
					gr	st	fc	[It was not]		
2	3				co	as	av	The impious (20) wonder where was abortion when we (20) needed it most	52	
									53	54
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
		6	ar	wa	as	47	[If a decision should be rational, then there should be no hysteria] (96)			
					gr	as	av	[This decision should be rational]		
					co	as	av	[There should be no hysteria]		
										aa
3	4					41	av	Calm down and listen carefully to the facts of the matter	52	
									53	54
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
		7	ar	wa	50	av	[If people believe in self-government, then they probably believe that constituted political authorities should decide how to spend tax money] (92)			
4	5				gr	as	av	We (20) believe in self-government		
&										
5										
6	6				co	50	av	We (20) probably believe that constituted political authorities should decide how to spend tax money	52	
&									53	54
7										
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
		8	ar	wa	as	av	[It is a routine exercise in political systems to take funds from the entire community for the benefit of certain members of the community for special social purposes]			
					gr	as	47	[Political democracies are political systems] (90)		

Table 8--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
8	7			co	as	av	It is routine exercise in political democracy to take funds from the entire community for the benefit of certain members of the community for special social purposes	is	53	54
+										aa
9	8	9	ar	wa	50	av	There is often disagreement about what social purposes are desired, and in some cases there are constitutional prohibitions			
10	9				st	fc	A community cannot declare that education in the dogmas of Christianity can be subsidized by public funds (78)			ai
11	10				st	fc	Public funds can be used to buy electric chairs, but people who occupy them are selected by a different process (78)			aa
12	11			gr	as	av	[The funding of abortion for poor women is a social purpose]			
				co	as	tr	Along comes abortion, and the political entities listed above decide that elective abortion is something public money will not be used to subsidize			
13	12				50	av	That would seem to be a decision entirely within the competence of the respective jurisdictions of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and St. Louis: and that is all the Supreme Court said	52	53	54
+										aa
				10	ar	wa	as	47	[If the press is abortion-hungry, then it transmutes the Court decision of 1973] (96)	
14	13			gr	as	47	The press is abortion-hungry (96)			
	14			co	as	av	The press has transmuted the Supreme Court decision of			

Table 8--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
							1973 into something entirely different (21)			
15			+	as	av	The Supreme Court decision of 1973 was bad enough as it stood		52	53	54
							aa			
							+			
							aa			
16	16	11	ar	wa	st	fc	In the Brown vs. Board of Education decision, the Court ruled in 1954 that no state could discriminate in education based on race			
							+			
							aa			
							st fc [Affirmative action is a program to redress past injustices against black people]			
							gr as tr [Governments can urge states to apply affirmative action in education in the interest of society]			
18	17		co	as	av	Before long every state was being urged to discriminate in education based on race		52	pn	tc
							+			
							aa			
17	18	12	ar	wa	as	av	Discrimination in education based on race is affirmative action			
18	19		gr	as	av	Before long every state was being urged to discriminate in education based on race		52		
20	20		co	as	av	[Argument] is bad logic		pn	tc	
							+			
							aa			
14	21	13	ar	wa	as	47	The Supreme Court decision of 1973 was bad enough as it stood (96)			

Table 8--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
18	22				+					aa
				st	fc		In the abortion decision of 1973, the Court said that no state could forbid abortion			
15	23			gr	as	47	Brown vs. Board of Education is an analogue (96)			
19	24			co	as	47	The abortion decision of 1973 was transformed, by the abortion lobby, into an obligation by the states--and the federal government--to subsidize abortion (95)			
20	25				+					aa
				as	47		Not only is the argument bad logic and ignorant history (95)	52		
21	26				+					aa
				as	47		It is a moral rip-off (95)	53	54	
					+					aa
14	ar	wa	as	av			[If people who consider certain activities sanctioned by their government to be morally wrong are required to pay for them, we (20) have an undesirable form of moral imperialism]			
22	27			gr	as	47	For many Americans, abortion is a grave moral wrong			
23	25			co	as	av	To be required to pay for abortion through taxation is an undesirable form of moral imperialism	52		
								53	54	
					+					aa
15	ar	wa	as	47			[To concentrate on the victims of abortion is rhetorically convenient] (96)			
24	29			gr	st	fc	The abortion lobby is concentrating now on the new "victims" of the abortion ruling			
30				co	as	av	It is rhetorically convenient to do so	52		
								53	54	
					+					aa
16	ar	wa	st	fc			[Fetuses can be aborted]			

Table 8--continued

RN			AR		IL		LO			PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC				TY	VC	TY
			gr as 47			[Fetuses are children] (91)			52			
25	28				co as av	Children can be aborted			53 54			
+												aa
			17	ar	wa	as	av	[If abortion is legal, then the fetuses are not victims and the women who are too poor to pay for an abortion are victims]				
			32	gr st fc			[Abortion is legal]					
			co as av			It is tacitly agreed [by the abortion lobby] that the aborted child is not to be considered a "victim"						
+												aa
26	33				as	av	He (29) is spoken of merely as something of a social nuisance, the detritus of a concupiscent evening between young lovers					
+												aa
27	34				st	fc	The New York Times editorialist speaks of abortions as now only "available to affluent women," referring to the Court's decision to "cut off poor women from abortions" leaving them "to unlicensed butchers or their unwanted children to misery"			52	pn tc	
+												aa
			18	ar	wa	as	av	[If you can get a reasonable return for a week's wages, that's a good free enterprise rate]				
33	35				gr	as	av	At \$150, that's about a week's wages for the guy, or--in a joint venture--half a week's wages for the gal, half a week for the guy				
			+									
34	36				st	fc	The price of a black and white television set (78)			a1		
			+									
35	37				st	fc	Six tickets to the Led Zeppelin (78)			aa		

Table 9
Analysis of Text B2

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
2	1	1	ar	wa	50	47	If you listen to the clamor of the pro-abortion crowd, you might suppose the Court to be composed of six monsters and three angels of light (96)			
1	2		gr	as	tr		The uproar continues over the Supreme Court's opinions of June 20 in the matter of abortion			
			co	50	av		[You might suppose the Court to be composed of nine such people]	52		
								53	54	
+										aa
			2	ar	wa	as	av	[If the justices are neither monsters nor angels, the denunciations are out of hand and undeserved]		
				gr	as	tr		[The justices are neither monsters nor angels]		
3	3		co	as	av		The denunciations are getting out of hand	52		
										aa
4	4		co	as	47		They are wholly undeserved	pn	tc	
+										aa
			3	ar	wa	as	av	[If the Court holds (p), this is commonsense]		
5	5		gr	st	fc		This is what the Court held (p)			
6	6		co	as	av		These holdings are common-sense	52		
								pn	tc	
+										aa
			4	ar	wa	st	fc	[If the Court holdings and the federal statute say the same, then they are clearly in accord with the federal statute]		
7	7		gr	st	fc		The law plainly leaves it to each state, in fashioning its Medicaid plan, to determine "the extent of medical assistance" that will be covered			

Table 9--continued

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY
12	16			co	as	av	expense The six-man majority sought to distinguish between the existence of a right, and the subsidized exercise of that right		52		
13	17			40	av		It is not hard to comprehend		53	54	
+											aa
16	18	8	ar	wa	as	av	There are a dozen analogies between a right to abortion and other rights				
17	19			gr	st	fc	I have a right of free press				
18	20				40	av	It doesn't mean the government must buy me a newspaper				aa
19	21				st	fc	Every citizen has a right of free speech				aa
20	22				40	av	The taxpayer is not going to hire him a hall				aa
21	23				st	fc	We have a right to the free exercise of religion				aa
22	24				as	av	It is not contended that the Treasury must finance churches and synagogues so the right may conveniently be exercised				aa
23	25				st	fc	There is a right to keep and bear arms				aa
24	26				40	av	We don't have a right to free rifles				aa
				co	st	fc	[Women have a right to an abortion]				aa
					as	av	[The taxpayer is not required to pay for a poor woman's abortion]		52	53 54	
+											aa
9	ar	wa	or	av	[If the above cases are not						

Table 9--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	VC
							closer to the status of those needing subsidized abortions, then let us move closer]				
			gr	as	av		[The above cases are not close enough]				
25	27		co	or	av		Let's move closer to the status of those on public welfare	52	pn	tc	
+ aa											
		10	ar	wa	as	av	[There is an analogy between the right to abortion and the right to travel (70)				
26	28		gr	st	fc		Every indigent person has a right to travel (78)				
+ aa											
27	29		as	av			Such a person may want to visit Hawaii; indeed, he may "need" to visit Hawaii; but for want of money it may be difficult or impossible for him to pay his own way				
			co	as	av		[A poor woman may want or need an abortion; but for want of money it may be difficult or impossible for her to pay for it]	52	pn	54	
+ aa											
		11	ar	wa	as	47	[If this is what pregnant women have demanded, then it is fatuous to argue (p) (96)				
29	30		gr	st	fc		Yet in principle, this is exactly what the petitioning pregnant women have demanded in the abortion cases	52			
28	31		co	as	av		It is fatuous to argue (p)	53	54		
+ aa											
		12	ar	wa	as	av	[If one accepts (p), such reasoning is lost on them]				
31	32		gr	st	fc		Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun variously denounced the majority's view as alarming, appalling, brutal, disingenuous.				

Table 9--continued

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY	
							distressing, disturbing, insensitive, punitive, sad, specious, tragic, unacceptable, vicious, ethically bankrupt and plainly erroneous					
32	33			st	fc	The effect, said Marshall, "will be to relegate millions of people to lives of poverty and despair"				aa		
30	34			co	as	av	Such reasoning was lost on the Court's three-man minority		52	pn	tc	
									aa			
13	ar	wa	ad	av	[If the situation of poor women is pathetic, then someone should pay for their abortions]							
33	35			gr	as	av	For what it may be worth, I myself agree with Marshall's pathetic exposition of the realities					
35	36			as	av	Unless poor women can obtain hospital abortions through Medicaid, they will resort to the brutal services of back-alley butchers, or they will go at it themselves with coat hangers and button hooks				aa		
36	37			as	av	Otherwise, they will carry their infants to full term, be delivered at public expense, and dump their progeny on the taxpayers for life				ad		
37	38			co	as	av	In both human and economic terms, state prohibitions against Medicaid abortions are tragic and costly					
34	39			as	av	In my own view, the states should include elective abortions in their Medicaid programs		is	pn	tc		
									ao			

Table 9--continued

RN	AR	IL	LO	PE	CO
SN SE AN TY VC TY VC				TY VC TY	
38 40 14	ar wa ad	47	As Powell sought vainly to emphasize, federal judges must not impose their own notions of wisdom and social desirability upon the law (96)		
	gr st fc	[The three-man minority did]		in	
	co ad av	[It shouldn't be done]		53 54	
	+				aa
39 41 15	ar wa as av		When it comes to such sensitive policy choices as the subsidizing of elective abortions,		
			"the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature"		
39 42	gr as av	[Abortion is such a policy]			
	co as av	The appropriate forum for the resolution of sensitive policy choices as the subsidizing of elective abortions is the legislature			
	+				aa
40 43	as av		That is sound jurisprudence, it ought to be praised, not condemned	in pn tc	

Table 10
Analysis of Text B3

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
		1	ar	wa	as	av	[Closet right-to-lifers don't honk their horns, don't carry picket signs, don't try to induce guilt in anyone who ever had or contemplated an abortion, and don't own gruesome photographs of human-looking fetuses]			
3	1		gr	st	fc		I've never honked my horn or carried picket signs in support of the anti-abortionists			
					+					aa
4	2		st	fc			I've never tried to induce guilt in anyone who's ever had or contemplated an abortion			
					+					aa
5	3		st	fc			I own no gruesome photograph of human-looking fetuses			
1	4		co	st	fc		I am a closet right-to-lifer	52		
					+					aa
2	5		st	fc			Not a practicing one	pn	tc	
					+					aa
		2	ar	wa	as	av	[People who allow their friends to believe that they take abortion-on-demand to be as benign a procedure as a cystectomy are believed to be pro-choice]			
6	6		gr	st	fc		I have simply allowed my sophisticated friends to believe that I, like them, take abortion-on-demand to be a benign a procedure as, say, a cystectomy, a natural concomitant of a woman's right to control her own body			
			co	as	av		[My friends believe I am pro-choice]			
					+					aa
7	7		st	fc			Some of my friends have let me know they were waiting for my column on the recent Supreme Court decision that indigent women have no constitutional right to state-financed abortions			

Table 10--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
										aa
8	8				+	st fc	"We're prepared to support what you have to say about it," said one, a women's rights activist	52	pn tc	
										aa
										aa
		3	ar	wa	as	av	[Groups of people who have been on the same side of most major issues assume that everybody in the group is going to be on the same side of abortion]			
9	9		gr	st	fc		We have been on the same side of most of the major issues			
	10		co	as	av		She assumed I was on the "right" side of this one as well	52		
										aa
10	11				+	st fc	I'm not		pn tc	
										aa
										aa
										aa
		4	ar	wa	as	47	[People for whom abortion isn't easy and who are not sure which side they are on should be embarrassed] (96)			
										aa
11	13		gr	st	fc		I'm not all the way on the other side, either (95)			
12	12		co	51	tr		My embarrassment is that the thing simply isn't easy for me the way it is for nearly everybody else	in		
										aa
13	14				+	50 47	Maybe I'm only a closet mugwump	53 54		
										aa
										aa
		5	ar	wa	as	av	[Personal dilemmas can be escaped by attacking the internal inconsistency in the source of the dilemma]			
15	15		gr	50	av		I really do believe that it is inconsistent to say, in one decision, that abortion is a perfectly acceptable medical procedure and, in another, that medically indigent women have			

Table 10--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY

no right to it										

16	16				+					aa
				ad	av		The right to control one's own			
							body should not be a matter of			
							economics			
14	17			co	50	av	My first thought was to escape			
							the dilemma by attacking the			
							Supreme Court for its incon-	is		
							sistency	53	54	

+										

				6	ar	wa	pe	av		
							[Consistency is not an accept-			
							able counter-argument]			
18	18			gr	as	av	After all, it could have been			
							consistent if the Court had said			
							that nobody, rich or poor, had			
							a right to abortion			
17	19			co	pe	av	Arguing on the basis of consis-			
							tency won't square me with my	in		
							friends	pn	tc	

+										

				7	ar	wa	as	av		
							[There is a possible analogy			
							between abortion and contra-			
							ception]			
				gr	as	av	[Contraception is a matter of			
							individual conscience]			
19	20			co	50	av	I've tried to persuade myself			
							that abortion is, finally, a			
							matter of individual	is		
							conscience--like contraception	53	tc	

+										

				8	ar	wa	as	av		
							[People who make the individual-			
							conscience argument on contra-			
							ception can decide not to make			
							babies]			
20	21			gr	as	av	The only people I know who			
							have made the individual-			
							conscience argument on			
							contraception are			
							Catholics looking for a way of			
							justifying their feeling that			
							the church was wrong about			

Table 10--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
<hr/>										
21	22			co	50	av	birth control It seems perfectly clear to me that people have the right to decide not to make babies		is 53	54
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
	9	ar	wa	as	av		[If we discuss the destruction of already-made babies, then I have a problem]			
				gr	as	47	[Abortion destroys already- made babies] (96)			
22	23			co	as	av	My problem comes after the babies are made	52 53		54
<hr/>										
+										ao
<hr/>										
	10	ar	wa	as	av		[If talking about a problem does not help, keep quiet]			
23	24			gr	as	av	Talking about abortion does not help			
<hr/>										
										aa
23	25			as	av		Talking suggests give-and-take, the possibility of compromise			
<hr/>										
										aa
25	26			as	av		There is no compromise on abortion			
<hr/>										
										aa
26	27			as	av		The arguments get so tricky	52		
23	28			co	as	av	I have avoided talking about it	pn	tc	
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
	11	ar	wa	as	47		[If you argue (p), then you cannot convince] (96)			
28	29			gr	st	fc	[The pro-abortionists argue (p)] (p=sentence 28)			
<hr/>										
										aa
27	30			as	av		The pro-abortionists will start with the act of intercourse and work forward			
<hr/>										
										aa
29	31			as	av		They make their point by demons- trating that there is no clear- cut demarcation between a fer- tilized egg and a fetus	52		

Table 10--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
30	32			co	as	av	No one convinces anyone else	53	54	
+										aa
31	33	12	ar	wa	as	av	Either you're talking about killing human beings, or you aren't			
32	34		gr	40	fc		We do kill human beings			
+										aa
33	35			st	fc		Not just on death row and on battlefields but also by unplugging the machines or deciding who will not have access to dialysis and other expensive treatments			
+										aa
				as	av		[Fetuses are human beings] (91)			
				co	as	av	[Abortion is the killing of human beings] (91)	52		
								53	54	
+										aa
		13	ar	wa	st	fc	[People who make the decision to abort seem easy bother me]			
34	36		gr	50	av		I suppose what bothers me is not the fact that some people decide for abortion but that they make the decision seem easy, almost offhand			
35	37		co	50	av		Maybe I'd feel better if they showed signs of agonizing about it			
+										aa
36	38			50	av		Which, I suppose, exposes me as a closet hypocrite	52		
								53	54	
+										aa
		14	ar	wa	st	fc	[Recognition of the difficulty of the subject of abortion attracts me]			
38	39		gr	pe	av		Allen would make exceptions for women suffering terminal illness or whose lives would be endangered by full-term pregnancy; pregnancies resulting from rape or incest; pregnancies			

Table 10--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
involving women who are severely handicapped, mentally or physically; or pregnant girls of 15 years or less										
39	40				+					aa
			pe	av			He'd be willing to change that to 17 years			
40	41				+					aa
37	42		as	av			Allen stops short of saying (p)			
			co	st	fc		I find myself attracted to Allen's proposed modification of the Hyde Amendment which would bar federal funds for abortions	52		
									pn	tc
										ao
41	43	15	ar	wa	or	av	If you want to sympathize with me, or castigate me, or even praise me for coming this far out of the closet, feel free			
			gr	as	tr		[These are the only active possibilities]			
			co	50	av		[You may do one of these things]	in		
									53	54
										ao
			16	ar	wa	or	47	[If arguments don't help, then spare me your arguments] (96)		
42	44		gr	st	fc			I've already heard them, and they don't help		
			45	co	or	av		Spare me your arguments		
43	46				+					aa
			or	av			Don't argue (p) (26)	52		
44	47				+					aa
			st	fc			I'm confused enough as it is	53	54	

Table 11
Analysis of Text B4

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
		1	ar	wa	as	av	[If an abortion sought is denied, the child born is unwanted]			
1	1		gr	as	tr		The S. C.'s ruling will deny some abortions			
	2		co	as	av		The resulting children are unwanted	in	pn	to
+										aa
		2	ar	wa	as	av	[If people react in a certain way, they are bitter]			
			gr	as	tr		[The abortion advocate reacted in a certain way]			
1	3		co	as	tr		The abortion advocate is bitter (78)	in	pn	54
+										aa
		3	ar	wa	as	av	[If people describe something a certain way, they are describing it with relish]			
			gr	as	tr		[The abortion advocate dis so]			
1	4		co	as	tr		The abortion advocate described with relish (78)	in	pn	54
+										aa
		4	ar	wa	ad	47	[If the demand for children is great, then they are not unwanted children and a burden on the taxpayer] (96)			
2	5		gr	as	av		According to a recent newspaper report the demand for Caucasian babies for adoption is so great these days that they are going for prices as high as \$20,000 on the black market (78)			
+										aa
4	6		as	av			There are, and have always been, private charities ready to accept unwanted babies of any ethnic background whatever (78)			
5	7		co	ad	av		No woman, then need be seriously concerned about having to care for her baby herself if she			

Table 11--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
							carries it to term; nor will it thereafter necessarily constitute a burden on the taxpayer	52	53	54
							+	aa		
1	8	5	ar	wa	as	av	The resulting children are unwanted and a burden			
							+	aa		
2	9				as	av	The demand is great in the black market			
							+	aa		
5	10				ad	av	No woman...on the taxpayer			
							gr as av [These constitute a paradox]			
							co as av [The argument fails]			
							+	aa		
3	11				50	av	That ought to dispose of any burden on taxpayers as far as "unwanted" white children are concerned	52	53	54
							+	aa		
							6 ar wa as av [This leaves only one argument undecided]			
6	12				gr	as av	What we are haggling over is whether, if a woman gets pregnant and decides she can't be bothered to go through the discomforts of gestation and childbirth, these same taxpayers ought to be compelled to pick up the bill if she demands an abortion			
7	13				co	as av	In leaving that decision up to the states, the Supreme Court drew a careful distinction between an individual's freedom to do certain things and the state's obligation to provide the individual with the means of doing them			
							+	aa		
8	14				st	fc	A state, it held, may be required to provide the wherewithal in certain cases (for example, in therapeutic abortions, where			

Table 11--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
							childbearing would endanger the mother's life) but has the option in other instances of providing it or not			
9	15				+					aa
			as	av			The state's decision in such cases is simply a matter of policy			
10	16				+					aa
			as	av			If it chooses to finance elective abortions, it may; if it chooses not to, it needn't	52	pn	tc
					+					aa
		7	ar	wa	as	47	[If there is a deep revulsion against elective abortions, then this is a sensible ruling] (96)			
11	17		gr	as	av		There is a deep revulsion against elective abortions felt by a majority of the voters (and taxpayers) in a number of states			
	18		co	as	av		That strikes me as an eminently sensible ruling	52	53	54
					+					aa
		8	ar	wa	as	av	[People who assume that the right to an abortion entails the funding of that right are enraged by the decision]			
12	19		gr	50	av		They seem to have assumed that, once the Court ruled in 1973 that a woman had an unlimited right to undergo an abortion during the first three months of her pregnancy, it followed as the night the day that she also had the right to make the government pay for it if she couldn't afford it herself			
13	20		co	as	av		Wicker moaned that, under the Court's latest ruling, "a right guaranteed to the rich is denied in practice to the poor"			

Table 11--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO		
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY	
							sanctioning a form of murder					
19	26			+ st fc		No state will be compelled to finance such an elective abortion--though some states may, no doubt will, choose to keep on doing so					aa	
20	27			co as av		This accommodates anti-abortion sentiment, to some extent, in those states where it is opposed by a majority of the voters					52 pn tc	
							+ aa					
21	28	11	ar	wa	as	av	Both sides are left to their legislative remedies, if they don't like this disposition of the problem					
							gr as av [Abortion advocates don't like it]					
							+ as av [Abortion foes don't like it]					aa
22	29			co as ca		Abortion advocates can go to work on the legislatures that have not sanctioned payments for elective abortions; and abortions; and abortion foes can seek a Constitutional amendment that will prohibit abortions altogether					52 pn tc	

Table 12
Analysis of Text B5

RN			AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC			TY	VC	TY
			1	ar	wa	as	av	[If the issue of abortion was not extinguished by the 1973 SC decision, it was smoldering]			
1	1			gr	as	av		The issue of abortion was not, as abortion advocates jubilantly thought, extinguished by the Suprem Court's 1973 decision			
			2		co	as	av	The issue of abortion was smoldering	in	pn	tc
+											aa
			2	ar	wa	as	av	[If the issue of abortion is revived, the jubilation is stilled]			
2	3			gr	as	av		Three related decisions [revived the issue]			
				co	as	av		[They have stilled the jubilation]	in	pn	tc
+											aa
			3	ar	wa	st	fc	[If the Constitution and federal welfare law don't require states to pay for elective abortions, then the states don't have to pay]			
3	4			gr	st	fc		The Court has ruled, 6-3, that neither the Constitution nor federal welfare law requires states to pay for medically unnecessary ("nontherapeutic") abortions	52		
				co	st	fc		[The states don't have to pay]	pn	tc	
+											aa
			4	ar	wa	as	47	[People who dissented in the Court ruling are now tortured by the majority concerning the meaning of what they wrote in 1973] (96)			
5	5.			gr	st	fc		Dissenting in the three latest cases, Blackmun says (p)			
+											aa
5	6			as	av			Blackmun wrote the tortured 1973			

Table 12--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
<hr/>										
4	7			co	as	av	ruling Blackmun now is tortured by the majority concerning the meaning of what he wrote	52 53	54	
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
	5	ar	wa	as	47		[If a reasonable distinction strikes someone as remarkable, then that is remarkable] (96)			
6	8			gr	as	av	That distinction is reason- able			
<hr/>										
6	9				+					aa
					as	av	That distinction strikes Black- mun as remarkable			
6	10			co	as	av	What is remarkable is that such a reasonable distinction strikes Blackmun as remark- able	52 53	54	
<hr/>										
+										aa
<hr/>										
	6	ar	wa	as	av		[If the Court ruling implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judg- ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds, then the states can refuse to fund elective abortions]			
7	11			gr	st	fc	The majority says the 1973 decision protected a woman's "freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy" but that right "implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judg- ment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds"			
<hr/>										
10	12				+					aa
					as	av	The indigency that may make it difficult--and in some cases, perhaps, impossible--for some women to have abortions is			

Table 12--continued

[illegible]

Table 12--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
										aa
										52
										53 54
										aa
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Table 12--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO	
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY	

+-----aa											
13 ar wa as 47 [If abortion kills an innocent person, this is murder and is repellent] (96)											
gr as tr [Some people feel that abortion kills an innocent person]											
+-----aa											
as tr [Some of these people are taxpayers]											
20	28	co as av Abortion is a form of killing that many taxpayers consider murder									
+-----aa											
21	29	as av The dissenters embraced some particularly repellent and revealing language (p) from a 1975 Court ruling									
									52		
									53	54	

+-----aa											
14 ar wa as 47 [People whose ideas are rejected get enraged] (96)											
22	30	gr st fc The decisions reject the idea that social policies must treat childbirth As merely a "medical method" in no way preferable to abortion									
+-----aa											
23	31	as av The goal of the pro-abortion forces is to use the courts to coerce society into (p)									
+-----aa											
23	32	as av The three recent decisions stop the pro-abortion forces short of their goal									
22	33	co as av Abortion enthusiasts are enraged									
									52		
									53	54	

+-----aa											
15 ar wa as 47 [Sensitive policies should be decided in the legislature] (96)											
24	34	gr st fc Regarding policy choices as sensitive as the funding of elective abortions, the Court									

Table 12--continued

RN		AR		IL		LO		PE		CO
SN	SE	AN	TY	VC	TY	VC		TY	VC	TY
majority says (p)										
		co		as		av		[The funding of elective abortions should be decided in the legislature]		
								52		
								53 54		
+										aa
16		ar		wa		as		47 [Abortion enthusiasts who have deal with the legislature get depressed] (96)		
25	35	gr		as		av		They know what awaits them there		
36		co		as		av		Abortion enthusiasts are depressed		
								52		
								53 54		

Results

As can be seen in Table 13, a total of 429 tokens, 288 in Group B and 141 in Group A, were found.

Table 13
SDDs in Group A and Group B

SDDs	Group A	Tokens Group B	Total
Syntactic	1	0	1
10	1	0	1
Semantic	5	9	14
20	0	4	4
21	1	1	2
26	2	3	5
28	2	0	2
29	0	1	1
Pragmatic	99	220	319
40	2	7	9
41	6	1	7
47	26	41	67
50	6	18	24
51	2	2	4
52	2	61	63
53	24	44	68
54	31	46	77
Argumentative	36	59	95
61	4	0	4
70	0	2	2
75	0	1	1
78	5	11	16
83	2	2	4
90	0	1	1
91	1	3	4
92	0	1	1
94	2	0	2
95	13	4	17
96	9	34	43
	----	----	----
Total	141	288	429

Almost half, 25 out of 56, of the SDDs posited appear in the corpus. The absence of phonological SDDs was

expected given the fact that the analysis used written rather than spoken texts.

The ranking of SDDs, presented in Table 14, shows that code 54 (Textual Distortion) has the highest rank. The lowest occurrences correspond to codes 29 (Personification), 92 (Contradiction), 75 (Misuse of Hypothetical Fact), 90 (Tautology), and 10 (Role Deletion), each representing one token.

Table 14
SDD Occurrences in the Data

SDDs	Number of Occurrences	Rank
54 (Textual Distortion)	77	1
53 (Interpersonal Domination)	68	2
47 (Unacceptable Claim)	67	3
52 (Ideational Domination)	63	4
96 (Unwarranted Assumption)	43	5
50 (Speculative Illocution)	24	6
95 (Unwarranted Conclusion)	17	7
78 (Extension)	16	8
40 (Normativized Description)	9	9
41 (Descriptivized Convention)	7	10
26 (Irony)	5	11
20 (Abstraction)	4	12
83 (Semantic Argument)	4	13
61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism)	4	14
91 (Contingent Falsity)	4	15
51 (Expressive Illocution)	4	16
21 (Generalization)	2	17
70 (Faulty Analogy)	2	18
28 (Hyperbole)	2	19
94 (Unstated Premiss)	2	20
92 (Contradiction)	1	21
29 (Personification)	1	22
75 (Misuse of Hypothetical Fact)	1	23
90 (Tautology)	1	24
10 (Role Deletion)	1	25

Total	429	

The results of frequency counts for the individual texts are given in Tables 15 (Group A) and 16 (Group B).

Table 15
SDDs in Group A by Text

SDDs	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5
10	0	0	1	0	0
21	0	1	0	0	0
26	1	1	0	0	0
28	0	2	0	0	0
40	0	0	1	0	1
41	1	2	0	3	0
47	11	5	0	9	1
50	3	0	0	2	1
51	0	1	0	1	0
52	1	1	0	0	0
53	7	6	1	7	3
54	8	7	4	8	4
61	0	1	1	1	1
78	2	2	0	1	0
83	0	0	1	1	0
91	0	0	0	0	1
94	2	0	0	0	0
95	6	3	0	4	0
96	4	3	0	2	0
	---	---	---	---	---
Total	46	35	9	39	12

Within the individual texts we can note the following differences:

A1: Codes 47, 54, 53, and 95 are more common.

A2: Codes 54, 53, and 47 are more common.

A3: Code 54 is more common.

A4: Codes 47, 54, and 53 are more common.

A5: Codes 54 and 53 are more common.

B1: Codes 47, 52, 53, 54, and 96 are more common.

B2: Codes 52, 54, and 53 are more common.

B3: Codes 52, 50, 53, 54, and 47 are more common.

B4: Codes 52, 54, 53, and 78 are more common.

B5: Codes 52, 47, 53, 54, and 96 are more common.

The texts in Group A have the least amount of SDD tokens: A3 has 9, A5 has 12, A2 has 35, A4 has 39, and A1 has 46. The texts in Group B have the most SDD tokens: B4 has 35, B2 has 41, B3 has 48, B5 has 81, and B1 has 113.

Table 16
SDDs in Group B by Text

SDDs	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5
20	4	0	0	0	0
21	1	0	0	0	0
26	2	0	1	0	0
29	1	0	0	0	0
40	0	4	1	2	0
41	1	0	0	0	0
47	19	4	5	3	10
50	6	2	8	2	0
51	0	0	1	1	0
52	18	11	10	8	14
53	16	6	8	5	9
54	16	7	7	7	9
70	1	1	0	0	0
75	0	1	0	0	0
78	6	1	0	4	0
83	2	0	0	0	0
90	1	0	0	0	0
91	1	0	2	0	0
92	1	0	0	0	0
95	3	0	1	0	0
96	14	4	4	3	9
<hr/>					
Total	113	41	48	35	51

As can be seen in Table 17, there is a set of SDDs which is shared by both groups: 54 (Textual Distortion), 53 (Interpersonal Domination), and 47 (Unacceptable Claim). There is another set of SDDs which characterizes Group A: 61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism) and 95 (Unwarranted Conclusion). Likewise, SDD 52 (Ideational Domination) characterizes Group B.

Table 17
SDD Distribution

SDDs	Tokens	
	Group A	Group B
Characteristic of Both Groups		
54 (Textual Distortion)	31	46
53 (Interpersonal Domination)	24	44
47 (Unacceptable Claim)	26	41
Characteristic of Group A		
61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism)	4	0
95 (Unwarranted Conclusion)	13	4
Characteristic of Group B		
52 (Ideational Domination)	2	61

We can summarize the findings:

1. In the overall data, code 54 (Textual Distortion) has the highest frequency in the corpus.
2. Both groups depend heavily on the use of textual distortion (SDD 54), interpersonal domination (SDD 53), and unacceptable claims (SDD 47). These three SDDs are characteristic of this type of writing (advocacy literature). Code 47 is

subject to empirical testing, but not code 53. Code 54 simply mirrors code 53.

3. The hypothesis of this dissertation is supported by the presence of codes 61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism) and 95 (Unwarranted Conclusion) in Group A, and code 52 (Ideational Domination) in Group B. Although code 61 does not have a great number of tokens, it is logically important because it destroys the argument. This failing in the logic of argumentation is represented by codes 61 and 95.
4. The text in Group A with the most SDDs is A1, 46 tokens, and in Group B is B1, 113 tokens.
5. Only 25 of the 56 types of SDDs posited appear in the data.
6. Phonological SDDs were nonexistent.
7. Of the total 429 tokens in the corpus, 288 appear in Group B.
8. Although no attempt was made to analyze the nature of the viewpoints expressed by the columnists, the following should be noted:
 - a. Group A is more homogeneous in their motivations than Group B. However,

text A3 uses inflammatory words to a much greater extent than any of the others did.

- b. In Group B, text B1 is a reaction to a New York Times editorial; text B2 both accepts state-funded abortions and rejects a Court-imposed solution, and text B3 is more of a personal, emotional reaction to the issue at hand. The average number of arguments for the corpus is 14.8 per text, or 14.2 arguments per text for Group A and 15.8 for Group B.

How these and other variables affected the results is something that must await another, more specific study.

9. The SDDs which characterize Group A seem to predict a majoritarian viewpoint, indicative of the group's disagreement with the Supreme Court decision, those of Group B a defensive viewpoint.

Concerning the properties of the model developed in this study, we can state that, unlike rhetoric (the art of

persuasion), ISA (the science of not being fooled--wrongfully persuaded) allows for the objectification of categories and the reconstruction of ellipsis.

CHAPTER V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As can be seen in Table 17 in Chapter IV, code 52 (Ideational Domination) is characteristic of Group B, and Codes 95 (Unwarranted Conclusion) and 61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism) of Group A. The findings, therefore, support the hypothesis of this study.

Summary of the Study

The purpose of this study was to develop and apply ISA, and to investigate the frequency of SDD occurrences in written texts advocating particular viewpoints for possible application in the study of ideology in texts. The data base consisting of ten texts, half in favor of federal funds for elective abortions and half against it, was collected from syndicated columnists whose features appear in major newspapers throughout the United States.

The basis for ISA is discussed in Chapter I. This chapter also contains definitions of key terms used in the study.

The nature of texts and ideology, and their interaction are discussed in Chapter II. The framework of a general theory of social action is presented and serves as basis for

language as social action, thereby establishing the interaction between texts and ideology. Argumentative acts and speech acts are presented as the logical and linguistic structures of a text, based on a modified 3-level speech act.

In Chapter III, the development of ISA in terms of its SDDs is presented. Four levels of analysis are discussed.

The data collection procedures, ISA methodology, the analysis of the ten texts, and the results are presented in Chapter IV. The corpus yielded 25 out of 56 types of SDDs. A total of 429 tokens were recorded, 141 for Group A and 288 for Group B. There is an absence of phonological SDDs and a heavy concentration of pragmatic and argumentative SDDs for both groups. In this corpus, codes 95 (Unwarranted Conclusion) and 61 (Invalid Hypothetical Syllogism) are characteristic of Group A while codes 52 (Ideational Domination) is characteristic of Group B. On the other hand, codes 54 (Textual Distortion), 53 (Interpersonal Domination), and 47 (Unacceptable Claim) are characteristic of both groups and of this type of writing (advocacy literature). Tables supporting these findings are provided in Chapter IV.

Suggestions for Further Study

Although certain SDDs are more frequent than others in the corpus analyzed, this does not mean that the other SDDs are to be neglected. It could mean, for example, that the authors in this study favor these SDDs or that the topic

chosen (public money for elective abortions) might condition the types of SDDs used. The use of a single topic was based on the need to eliminate variables which may influence the results. However, a way to validate the findings of this study would be to analyze ten different topics by the same writers. Also, a larger sample of texts might indicate that though a type of SDD is seldom used in the texts analyzed, its use may be crucial. At this stage of ISA, frequency should not be the sole basis for deciding what SDDs to keep or discard. The next step in the investigation should probably be in the direction of textual types. This should begin to answer questions concerning, for example, why certain SDDs are more common in certain data. Even if we just consider the small sample used in this study, we can gain some insight as to why pragmatic SDDs are characteristic of the two groups. In all ten texts, the authors made an effort to persuade us of the truth of their propositions by means of unjustified assertions (code 47), the manipulation of linguistic interactions (code 53), and textual distortion (code 54). It is reasonable that such SDDs abound in such situations.

Another area of study should aim at defining and testing mechanical, or mechanizable, procedures that permit the discovery of the organizational structures of texts. The model proposed here has applications in the field of computational linguistics, specifically in artificial intelligence and knowledge representation.

A Final Word

The focus of this study was the construction and application of a model for the linguistic analysis of ideology in texts. The entire process was highly iterative in nature. It was necessary to engage in all elements of model building, testing, and revising almost simultaneously. The findings produced some clues to the structure of ideology in texts. The model is subject to verification by other analysts. It is premature to say that the model is either complete or representative of all texts. This study developed a logical rationale for building a model for the ideological structure analysis of a certain type of text. My effort was consciously exploratory.

In general, ISA seems to be well suited for the study of ideological structure. However, due to the small sample and the exploratory nature of this study, I feel that more textual types have to be analyzed in order to test and refine the SDDs posited in this study.

ISA has just begun. There is still a long way to go.

APPENDIX A
TEXT A1

The Narrowness of "Necessary"

by

Tom Braden

<1> Mr. Justice Lewis Powell, a kindly as well as an intelligent man, has put his country into a terrible jam, and I don't think he foresaw the consequences of his thought.

<2> It must have seemed perfect logic to him to argue that nothing in the Constitution requires the states of the Union to pay for abortions which are not "necessary though perhaps desirable."

<3> As he pointed out, just because the Constitution says we are all entitled to equal protection of the laws doesn't mean that a state which dispenses free medical care must provide that care for procedures which are not "necessary." <4> And a therapeutic abortion is not "necessary," as doctors define the term. <5> That is Powell's logic.

<6> The trouble with the logic is its terrible narrowness. <7> It restricts itself to the medical definition of "necessary." <8> Supreme Court justices have

an obligation to a larger and social view. <9> What is "unnecessary" from a doctor's standpoint may be very necessary from the standpoint of the country. <10> In the argument in which the court engaged, the only man who made this distinction and made it with facts and figures was Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall.

<11> There is, said Justice Marshall, an estimated need for about 1.8 million abortions in this country each year. <12> About a third of these needs go unmet. <13> Which means that each year, the citizens of this country take on the burden of 600,000 unwanted children.

<14> Heed Justice Marshall's view of the result: "An unwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of any woman, but the impact is felt most by those too poor to ameliorate these effects. If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a poor woman may feel that she is forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses a serious threat to her health and even her life.["]

"If she refuses to take this risk, and undergoes the pain and danger of state-financed pregnancy and child birth, she may well give up all chance of escaping the cycle of poverty. Absent daycare facilities, she will be unable to work so that her family can break out of the welfare system or the lowest income brackets. If she already has children, another infant to feed and clothe may well stretch the budget past the breaking point. All chance to control the direction of her own life will have been lost."

<15> But even Justice Marshall did not advert, as Justices are fond of saying, to all the deprivations which will be suffered by the rest of us. <16> Six hundred thousand unwanted children each year means 600,000 mouths which the rest of us will have to feed and 600,000 bodies which the rest of us will have to clothe, at least until such time as they are old enough to get into the heroin business and rob and mug us on the streets.

<17> Six hundred thousand unwanted children each year means the further deterioration of the family and of family values. <18> How Jimmy Carter and his secretary of Health, Education and Welfare can talk on the one hand about restoring family values in the country and on the other hand support Mr. Justice Powell's view that the government should not pay indigent mothers for abortion is a question they ought to ask in their prayers.

<19> They are leading us to more welfare, more crime in the streets, and as a matter of fact, as soon as the unwanted children grow to puberty, more demands for abortions.

<20> I agree with the argument that the question of abortion is one to be decided by the mother (and father) and the doctor. <21> I agree with those who hold further that it is unfair to permit this decision to be freely made by those who can afford it while withholding that freedom from those who cannot.

<22> But these points have been made time and again.

<23> What has not been sufficiently stressed in the argument about abortion is the interest of the rest of us, that is, of the country as a whole.

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APPENDIX B
TEXT A2

(No title)

by

David S. Broder

<1> Like most politicians who were on their way up in the early 1960s, Jimmy Carter has a well-developed case of Kennedy envy. <2> It turns up in everything from his hairdo to his speech. <3> So it was not altogether surprising that when pressed for his views on the equity of recent abortion decisions by Congress and the Supreme Court, President Carter fell back on Kennedy's famous observation that "life is unfair."

<4> Judy Woodruff of NBC, referring to the legislative and judicial actions against Medicaid payments for abortion, asked: "How fair do you believe it is that women who can afford to get an abortion can go ahead and have one and women who cannot afford to are precluded from this?"

<5> Carter replied: "Well, as you know, there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can't. But I don't believe that the federal government should take action to try to make these

opportunities exactly equal, particularly when there is a moral factor involved."

<6> Carter did more than borrow John Kennedy's words; he wrenched them out of context. <7> When Kennedy said "life is unfair," he was responding to the complaints of Army Reservists mobilized during the Berlin crisis. <8> He was not talking about the 350,000 poor women--one-third of them teenagers--who last year sought government aid in ending unwanted, sometimes dangerous, pregnancies.

<9> A nation--or a President--that cannot distinguish between the inevitable inequities in a military mobilization and the deliberate decision to deny help to a pregnant teenager is a nation which has lost its way.

<10> Some members of the House tried to say just that, in arguing unsuccessfully against the Hyde amendment, which denies federal funds for abortion, even in the case of incest or rape or to save the mother's life.

<11> Rep. Parren J. Mitchell (D) of Baltimore, the head of the congressional black caucus, told of visiting a patient at Brownsville State Hospital for the mentally ill, the victim of a rape case who went through an illegal back-alley abortion. <12> "She is still there," he said, "paranoid, detached, alienated, not even a woman, because we permitted an illegal abortion to take place, a brutal, vicious assault on her."

<13> Others were not so sympathetic. <14> Rep. Eldon Rudd (R) of Scottsdale, Ariz., few of whose constituents

need help from the government, found it as easy as Carter to dismiss the concern about "discrimination against the poor."

<15> "By that logic," he said, "taxpayers can be forced by Congress to pay for poor people to have faceliftings, hair transplants, expensive cars, and tickets to the Kennedy Center."

<16> If "a woman has a right to control her own body," Rudd said, "let her exercise control--before she gets pregnant."

<17> It was such comments as these that caused Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D) of Brooklyn to remark that the Hyde amendment would not prevail if the House had 417 women and 18 men, instead of the reverse, as is the case today.

<18> Ironically, a few days after this debate, Holtzman's district was one of those ravaged by looters in the New York blackout--a reminder to Carter and the rest of us that the social consequences of unwanted, uncared-for children are felt by everyone, not just their mothers.

<19> The comment that capsuled my own reaction to the debate came from Rep. Charles Rose (D) of Fayetteville, N.C., where Carter's sister lives.

<20> Rose is just about as radical as you would expect the head of the congressional rural caucus to be. <21> But after listening to the House debate, he said: "I cannot believe what I have heard.... If your religious convictions tell you abortion is wrong, honor them. But do not impose

on the poor women of this nation this kind of strapping discrimination."

<22> Like Rose, I believe one must honor the deep convictions of those who oppose abortion on moral grounds. <23> One must respect the holding of the Supreme Court that there is no clear constitutional mandate requiring federal or state-financed abortions.

<24> But one must also remember what we are talking about. <25> The amount of money involved here is \$45 million--exactly what the taxpayers provided last fall to finance Carter's and Gerald Ford's general election campaigns.

<26> Those campaign funds were not there because everyone in America thought that it was a good idea. <27> They were available because Congress provided a voluntary checkoff on the tax form--which less than one-third of the taxpayers used.

<28> Jimmy Carter is in the White House today because of those funds. <29> And from that position, he says it is no business of his to help find a way--a constitutionally permissible and morally acceptable way--for equivalent funds to be used to help pregnant, needy women.

<30> Life is unfair, all right. <31> But, as Carter also used to say in the campaign, "It is not the people in positions of power who suffer when the government makes a mistake."

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APPENDIX C
TEXT A3

Following "Right-to-Life" Logic

by

Ernest B. Furgurson

<1> There is jubilation among the single-minded "right-to-life" lobby. <2> The lobby has mortally scared the White House, the House of Representatives and the Senate. <3> It has bluffed the Supreme Court into rendering the court's own 1973 decision on abortion rights essentially meaningless for those Americans most desperately concerned.

<4> It is ready now to concentrate on the 50 state legislatures, with its tested tactics of threatening to rout from office all who do not bow down on this one and only issue.

<5> Its cheerleaders in print and politics are celebrating its string of victories over the "pro-abortion" villains (who by repeated public opinion surveys constitute most of the republic).

<6> For the first time, some politicians who have made a career of opposing every dollar of aid to poor Americans have discovered that they are actually pro-poor, pro-black,

pro-Latin. <7> They prove it by voting against the use of public money to pay for abortions. <8> As logic goes, it is indeed circuitous. <9> But try to follow it.

<10> "You don't solve the problems of the poor by killing them. You solve them by alleviating poverty," rings the warning from the House floor. <11> In elucidation, a "right-to-life" columnist adds, "It is, indeed, an odd form of assistance to blacks to do away with life in their midst. Blacks are disproportionately victims of abortion. About 300,000 of the first million abortions were of blacks..."

<12> Note the use of the word "victims" here. <13> By definition, victims are not volunteers, as are all the women who opt to end unwanted pregnancies. <14> But "victim" has a nice emotional connotation, so it is standard usage. <15> So is the adjective "pro-abortion," when the plurality of Americans consistently shown to favor tolerant laws on the subject is no more pro-abortion than it is pro-appendectomy. <16> It is pro-choice, believing in a woman's right to decide with her physician what course she will take, without the interference of others who have no personal stake in that decision.

<17> Of course, in these most recent cases, the court and the Congress have not come right out and said women have no freedom of choice. <18> They have said merely that federal programs that pay for every other medical service should not be used for this one. <19> And to justify this

clear class legislation, the most ingenious logicians among them have announced that they are doing the poor a favor.

<20> It is useful here to recall what some of the blacks directly concerned said in response to this reasoning.

<21> Justice Thurgood Marshall, for example, writing in dissent said, "I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who preach a 'right-to-life' that means, under present social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor women and their children." <22> He said the ruling would "brutally coerce" those women "to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of their lives."

<23> Rep. Louis Stokes of Cleveland: "In terms of its effect, the new Hyde Amendment (against Medicaid money for abortions) is tantamount to a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion for the poor."

<24> Carl Rowan, who was born poor and black in Mississippi, summed it up in a column: The trend will force women in depressed families "to bear children they do not want, guaranteeing another generation of people whom the rest of society can hate because they are 'welfare burdens.' They commit crimes, they are often sick, dirty and diseased."

<25> And yet, the roll calls show that on the court and in Congress the hard core of those imposing this burden are the same ones who slash welfare funding, rave about crime

and miss no opportunity to record their contempt for the victims of their votes.

<26> This time, the word "victim" is used precisely.

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APPENDIX D
TEXT A4

The "Born Again" Anti-Abortionist

by

Carl T. Rowan

<1> When Jimmy Carter was struggling to win the Democratic nomination, and then the presidency, almost nothing about him bothered more Americans than his "born again" religiosity.

<2> Many Democrats expressed what I considered silly fears that Carter would bring a self-righteous arrogance to the Oval Office, listening to no mortal advisors because he was constantly talking to God.

<3> Mr. Carter has not been proselytizing the American people with Southern Baptist evangelism. <4> He has neither bored nor angered Americans with gawkish displays of piety. <5> Not until his anti-abortion declarations last week did he lay himself vulnerable to a charge that he let his religious biases take precedence over the national interest.

<6> And if he thinks he communed with God before his abortion remarks, Mr. Carter obviously feels sure that God is a man, because he stirred a mini-revolt among top-level

women in his administration. <7> From bureaus and agencies all over this town they flocked to the White House to protest their President's opposition to using federal Medicaid funds to finance abortions for poor women.

<8> I applaud these women officials, all of whom are affluent enough not to need Medicaid money for abortions or anything else. <9> They were protesting because they saw the President for whom they worked taking a bad public policy stand dictated by church dogma.

<10> They saw their leader clinging to the notion that a woman's body is not her own, and that if someone gets her pregnant she is morally bound to have the baby. <11> Even if she's a 14-year-old whose life will be wrecked; even if she's so emotionally disturbed that having another baby will push her into a mental institution; even if the odds are high that the baby will be mongoloid, born with sickle cell anemia, deformed by the mother's German measles.

<12> I am sure that the women in the Carter administration want to hear Mr. Carter's explanation (as I do) as to how he decided it is "moral" to draw the line on Medicaid abortions only in cases of rape, incest and when the mother's life is at stake. <13> How did he rule out the other cases, the ones I mentioned above?

<14> The ugly truth is that it is easy to draw such lines when they apply only to the poorest, least vocal, politically least powerful women in the land. <15> Affluent women who paid for more than 700,000 abortions last year

won't be penalized by the President's imposition of personal morality--only the 300,000 poor women who could get safe abortions only because Medicaid money made it possible.

<16> I hope the women of the Carter administration are also outraged because Mr. Carter justified this with a profound observation that "many things in life are not fair" regarding the rich and poor. <17> He went on to assert that he doesn't "believe that the federal government should take action to try to make these opportunities (to get abortions) exactly equal."

<18> The protesting women are asking how a President who campaigned as a populist, a friend of the little guy, could now be saying, in effect: "Sure, the poor suffer a lot of burdens and discriminations. So what does it matter if I heap one more on them in the name of morality?"

<19> We can argue with conviction that it is not government's responsibility to make results, or even rewards, equal for every citizen's endeavors, but in a democratic society it must be the government's duty to make opportunities as equal as is humanly possible.

<20> I think Jimmy Carter knows this. <21> Perhaps the women in his top echelon can find out why he abandoned that principle in so far as the pregnant poor are concerned.

By Carl Rowan.

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APPENDIX E
TEXT A5

Kitchen-Table Justice

by

Tom Wicker

<1> If you're a pregnant woman with enough money to pay for an abortion in a hospital, you've got an ironclad constitutional right to have that abortion. <2> If you're a pregnant woman without enough money to pay for an abortion in a hospital, you've got an ironclad constitutional right either to beg or borrow the money, or to have yourself butchered on a kitchen table off some back alley.

<3> So ruled the Supreme Court of the United States last week, in an opinion consonant with the views of the Carter Administration and to which Congress seems about to give further legislative force. <4> Thus, with the support of all three branches of government, triumph inequity, poverty, misery, the welfare culture and the billions of tax dollars it annually consumes.

<5> The first step down this strange course was taken by Congress last year when it adopted a ban on the use of

Medicaid funds for elective abortions, those not undertaken for therapeutic reasons.

<6> A Federal court, acting on what it and everyone else thought was the Supreme Court's guarantee of the right to an abortion in a 1973 decision, set aside enforcement of this ban until its constitutionality could be tested.

<7> Enter the Carter Administration, in the person of Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph A. Califano. <8> He said he would not support the use of Federal funds for abortions, and President Carter backed him up.

<9> Possibly owing to that encouragement, this year the House of Representatives went even further than Congress had last year; it passed a ban on the use of Medicaid funds for any kind of abortion, even to save the life of a mother.

<10> At that point last week, the Supreme Court acted on cases from Connecticut and Pennsylvania, ruling that (a) the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws was not violated by a state decisions to use Medicaid funds for childbirth but not for abortions; and (b) it was not unreasonable for a state to pursue its "valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth" by refusing to pay for abortions.

<11> The next day, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the House ban on Medicaid abortions but amended it to permit therapeutic abortions required by threats to the

physical well-being of the mother or the child after birth or both.

<12> This provision, which apparently is about all that can be hoped for in the Senate, coincides with the Supreme Court ruling in that it guarantees affluent or middle-class women the right to abortions on demand, while preventing the use of Government funds to pay for elective abortions for women who cannot otherwise pay for them. <13> The latter must either have their babies, at even greater cost to the taxpayers, or seek out some fly-by-night amateur for a kitchen-table abortion.

<14> Aside from a person's moral and ethical views on the larger question of abortion, the situation wrought by Court and Congress is insupportable. <15> It plainly discriminates against a class, since a right guaranteed to the rich is denied in practice to the poor. <16> That discrimination will be most often felt by black women in the city ghettos, those very "welfare mothers" against whom the righteous wrath of the comfortable and the calloused is so often directed.

<17> And what conceivable "valid and important interest" can cities like New York and Detroit have in encouraging more welfare mothers and more welfare children, more poverty and hunger and disease and drug addiction in the ghettos, more unemployed on the corners, more crime in the streets, more flight of the middle class to the suburbs?

<18> The real questions here are not of morality or religion or ethics. <19> If the case could be made against legal abortion for anyone, that would be at least equitable among women, although a long step backward for them all. <20> But to make the poor alone ineligible for abortions defies justice, common sense, rational policy and the Federal budget.

<21> As Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts put it, the ban on Medicaid funds for abortions is "nothing but a means test saying who's allowed to have an abortion." <22> And as Mr. Justice Harry Blackmun, in dissent, chided his colleagues: "There is another world 'out there,' the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. And so the cancer of poverty will continue to grow."

<23> The figures that support him are as depressing as they are impressive. <24> Medicaid funds have paid for abortions for as many as 300,000 women a year, at a total cost of \$50 million. <25> Sixty percent of the nation's 1.1 million abortions a year are performed in clinics for the poor--and only 29 percent in those private hospitals in which the Supreme Court absolutely guarantees the right of a woman who can afford it to an abortion on demand.

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APPENDIX F
TEXT B1

The Court on Abortion

by

William F. Buckley, Jr.

<1> You would think, reading the New York Times editorial, that the Supreme Court of the United States had just voted, 6-3, to authorize the spending of public money on concentration camps. <2> The sheer hysteria with which the Court's abortion decision is being met by this tuning fork of eastern seaboard liberalism sometimes makes the impious wonder where was abortion when we needed it most.

<3> People should calm down and listen carefully to the facts of the matter.

<4> 1. Do we believe in self-government?

<5> The answer is of course, yes.

<6> 2. Do we believe that constituted political authorities --for instance, the state of Connecticut, the state of Pennsylvania, the city of St. Louis-- should decide how to spend tax money?

<7> The answer is a qualified yes. <8> It is a routine exercise in political democracy to take funds from the

entire community for the benefit of certain members of the community for specified social purposes. <9> There is often disagreement about what social purposes are desired, and in some cases there are constitutional prohibitions. <10> A community cannot, for example, declare that education in the dogmas of Christianity can be subsidized by public funds. <11> Public funds can be used to buy electric chairs, but people who occupy them are selected by a different process.

<12> 3. Along comes abortion, and the political entities listed above decide that elective abortion is something public money will not be used to subsidize. <13> That would seem to be a decision entirely within the competence of the respective jurisdictions of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and St. Louis: and that is all the Supreme Court said. <14> The abortion-hungry press has transmuted the Supreme Court decision of 1973 (which was bad enough as it stood) into something entirely different.

<15> An analogue is Brown vs. Board of Education. <16> In that decision, the Court ruled in 1954 that no state could discriminate in education based on race. <17> Before long every state was being urged to discriminate in education based on race --only they call it affirmative action.

<18> In the abortion decision of 1973, the Court said that no state could forbid abortion. <19> That decision was transformed, by the abortion lobby, into an obligation by the states--and the federal government--to subsidize

abortion. <20> Not only is the argument bad logic and ignorant history. <21> It is a moral rip-off. <22> For many Americans, abortion is a grave moral wrong. <23> To be required to pay for abortion through taxation is an undesirable form of moral imperialism.

<24> It is rhetorically convenient for the abortion lobby to concentrate now on the new "victims" of the abortion ruling. <25> It is tacitly agreed that the aborted child is not to be considered a "victim." <26> He is spoken of merely as something of a social nuisance, the detritus of a concupiscent evening between young lovers. <27> The New York Times editorialist speaks of abortions as now only "available to affluent women," referring to the Court's decision to "cut off poor women from abortions" leaving them "to unlicensed butchers or their unwanted children to misery."

<28> A couple of telephone calls in New York City establish that you can get an abortion for \$150. <29> Good stuff. <30> Licensed doctor. <31> Private clinic: good free enterprise rate. <32> Outside New York things are generally cheaper. <33> At \$150, that's about a week's wages for the guy, or--in a joint venture--half a week's wages for the gal, half a week for the guy. <34> The price of a black and white television set. <35> Six tickets to the Led Zeppelin. <36> Three years of Time Magazine. <37> Two years of Hustler. <38> Surely that's not too high a

price to pay for saving yourself the nuisance and high cost
of a child?

ON THE RIGHT by Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

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APPENDIX G
TEXT B2

Buy Me a Printing Press?

by

James J. Kilpatrick

<1> The uproar continues over the Supreme Court's opinions of June 20 in the matter of abortion. <2> To listen to the clamor of the pro-abortion crowd, you might suppose the Court to be composed of six monsters and three angels of light. <3> The denunciations are getting out of hand. <4> They are wholly undeserved.

<5> This is what the Court held, and all that it held: (1) No woman has a constitutional right to an abortion at public expense. (2) Federal law allows the states, but does not require the states, to provide elective abortions under their Medicaid plans.

<6> These common-sense holdings are clearly in accord with both the federal statute and the United States Constitution. The statute (Title XIX of the Social Security Act) scarcely requires construction. <7> The law plainly leaves it to each state, in fashioning its Medicaid plan, to determine "the extent of medical assistance" that will be

covered. <8> The statute does not require that every state fund every medical procedure known to medical science.

<9> The constitutional principles are equally self-evident. <10> It is simply bizarre to argue, as the complainants argued in these cases, that because the government agrees to pay for poor Jane's delivery, the government denies "equal protection" when it refuses to pay for poor Susan's abortion. <11> The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, if they could hear of this nonsense, would roll over in their graves.

<12> The six-man majority sought to distinguish between the existence of a right, and the subsidized exercise of that right. <13> Is that so hard to comprehend? <14> During the first trimester of pregnancy, women have a right to obtain an abortion; the state may not make it a crime to perform such abortions. <15> But there is no accompanying right to elective abortion at public expense.

<16> A dozen analogies spring to mind. <17> I have a right of free press. <18> Does this mean the government must buy me a newspaper? <19> Every citizen has a right of free speech. <20> Must the taxpayers hire him a hall? <21> We have a right to the free exercise of religion. <22> It is not contended that the Treasury must finance churches and synagogues so the right may conveniently be exercised. <23> There is a right to keep and bear arms. <24> Do we have a right to free rifles?

<25> Let us move closer to the status of those on public welfare. <26> Every indigent person has a right to travel. <27> Such a person may want to visit Hawaii; indeed, he may "need" to visit Hawaii; but for want of money it may be difficult or impossible for him to pay his own way. <28> It is fatuous to argue that the taxpayers, because they may provide free urban bus fares for the elderly, therefore must buy the indigent a round-trip ticket to Honolulu. <29> Yet in principle, this is exactly what the petitioning pregnant women have demanded in the abortion cases.

<30> Such reasoning was lost on the Court's three-man minority. <31> Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun variously denounced the majority's view as alarming, appalling, brutal, disingenuous, distressing, disturbing, insensitive, punitive, sad, specious, tragic, unacceptable, vicious, ethically bankrupt and plainly erroneous. <32> The effect, said Justice Marshall, "will be to relegate millions of people to lives of poverty and despair."

<33> For what it may be worth, I myself agree with Justice Marshall's pathetic exposition of the realities. <34> In my own view, the states should include elective abortions in their Medicaid programs. <35> Unless poor women can obtain hospital abortions through Medicaid, they will resort to the brutal services of back-alley butchers, or they will go at [it] themselves with coat hangers and button hooks. <36> Otherwise, they will carry their infants

to full term, be delivered at public expense, and dump their progeny on the taxpayers for life. <37> In both human and economic terms, state prohibitions against Medicaid abortions are tragic and costly.

<38> Nevertheless, as Mr. Justice Powell sought vainly to emphasize, federal judges must not impose their own notions of wisdom and social desirability upon the law. <39> When it comes to such sensitive policy choices as the subsidizing of elective abortions, "the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature." <40> That is sound jurisprudence; it ought to be praised, not condemned.

A CONSERVATIVE VIEW by James J. Kilpatrick.

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APPENDIX H
TEXT B3

(No title)

by

William Raspberry

<1> Probably the best thing is to say it right out: I think I am a closet right-to-lifer.

<2> Not a practicing one, mind you. <3> I mean I've never honked my horn or carried picket signs in support of the anti-abortionists. <4> I've never tried to induce guilt in anyone who's ever had or contemplated an abortion. <5> I own no gruesome photograph of human-looking fetuses.

<6> I have simply allowed my sophisticated friends to believe that I, like them, take abortion-on-demand to be as benign a procedure as, say, a cystectomy, a natural concomitant of a woman's right to control her own body.

<7> I probably wouldn't be saying anything even now, except that some of my friends have let me know they were waiting for my column on the recent Supreme Court decision that indigent women have no constitutional right to state-financed abortions. <8> "We're prepared to support

what you have to say about it," said one, a women's rights activist.

<9> What she meant, of course, is that because we have been on the same side of most of the major issues, she assumed I was on the "right" side of this one as well.

<10> I'm not. <11> I'm not all the way on the other side, either. <12> My embarrassment is that the thing simply isn't easy for me the way it is for nearly everybody else. <13> Maybe I'm only a closet mugwump.

<14> My first thought was to escape the dilemma by attacking the Supreme Court for its inconsistency. <15> I really do believe that it is inconsistent to say, in one decision, that abortion is a perfectly acceptable medical procedure and, in another, that medically indigent women have no right to it. <16> The right to control one's own body should not be a matter of economics.

<17> But arguing on the basis of consistency won't square me with my friends. <18> After all, it would have been consistent if the Court had said that nobody, rich or poor, had a right to abortion.

<19> I've tried to persuade myself that abortion is, finally, a matter of individual conscience--like contraception. <20> But the only people I know who have made the individual-conscience argument on contraception are Catholics looking for a way of justifying their feeling that the church was wrong about birth control. <21> It seems perfectly clear to me that people have the right to decide

not to make babies. <22> My problem comes after the babies are made.

<23> I have avoided talking about it because talking about it doesn't help. <24> Talking suggests give-and-take, the possibility of compromise. <25> But there is no compromise on abortion.

<26> Besides, the arguments get so tricky. <27> The pro-abortionists will start with the act of intercourse and work forward. <28> If you can accept contraception--the prevention of a birth--or a morning-after pill or some therapeutic measure that interrupts a pregnancy before there is any evidence that there is a pregnancy, then why not accept abortion after several weeks? <29> They make their point by demonstrating that there is no clear-cut demarcation between a fertilized egg and a fetus.

<30> And no one convinces anyone else. <31> Either you're talking about killing human beings, or you aren't.

<32> We do kill human beings, though, don't we? <33> Not just on death row and on battlefields but also by unplugging the machines or deciding who will not have access to dialysis and other expensive treatments. <34> I suppose what bothers me is not the fact that some people decide for abortion but that they make the decision seem easy, almost offhand. <35> Maybe I'd feel better if they showed signs of agonizing about it.

<36> Which, I suppose, exposes me as a closet hypocrite.

<37> Because of my wishy-washiness on the subject, I find myself attracted to Rep. Clifford Allen's proposed modification of the Hyde Amendment which would bar federal funds for abortions. <38> Allen (D-Tenn.) would make exceptions for women suffering terminal illnesses or whose lives would be endangered by full-term pregnancy; pregnancies resulting from rape or incest; pregnancies involving women who are severely handicapped, mentally or physically; or pregnant girls of 15 years or less. <39> (He'd be willing to change that to 17 years.)

<40> But he stops short (as I do) of saying that any woman who wants an abortion for any reason should have it.

<41> If you want to sympathize with me, or castigate me, or even praise me for coming this far out of the closet, feel free. <42> But spare me your arguments--not because my mind is made up but because I've already heard them, and they don't help.

<43> And please no cheap shots about how I'd feel different if I were a woman. <44> I'm confused enough as it is.

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APPENDIX I
TEXT B4

New Light on Abortion Rights

by

William A. Rusher

<1> In a television interview shortly after the Supreme Court's 6 to 3 ruling that a state need not subsidize an elective (i.e., non-therapeutic) abortion, a bitter abortion advocate described with relish how much this decision would cost the taxpayers, who would now (he asserted) have to foot the bill for raising large numbers of "unwanted" children.

<2> Yet according to a recent newspaper report the demand for Caucasian babies for adoption is so great these days that they are going for prices as high as \$20,000 on the black market. <3> That ought to dispose of any burden on taxpayers as far as "unwanted" white children are concerned. <4> And there are, and have always been, private charities ready to accept unwanted babies of any ethnic background whatever.

<5> No woman, then, need be seriously concerned about having to care for her baby herself if she carries it to term; nor will it thereafter necessarily constitute a burden

on the taxpayers. <6> What we are haggling over is whether, if a woman gets pregnant and decides she can't be bothered to go through the discomforts of gestation and childbirth, those same taxpayers ought to be compelled to pick up the bill if she demands an abortion.

<7> In leaving that decision up to the states, the Supreme Court drew a careful distinction between an individual's freedom to do certain things and the state's obligation to provide the individual with the means of doing them. <8> A state, it held, may be required to provide the wherewithal in certain cases (for example, in therapeutic abortions, where childbearing would endanger the mother's life) but has the option in other instances of providing it or not. <9> The state's decision in such cases is simply a matter of policy. <10> If it chooses to finance elective abortions, it may; if it chooses not to, it needn't.

<11> That strikes me as an eminently sensible ruling, given the deep revulsion against elective abortions felt by a majority of the voters (and taxpayers) in a number of states, but it has enraged a good many advocates of abortion-on-demand. <12> They seem to have assumed that, once the Court ruled in 1973 that a woman had an unlimited right to undergo an abortion during the first three months of her pregnancy, it followed as the night the day that she also had the right to make the government pay for it if she couldn't afford it herself.

<13> Thus Tom Wicker moaned that, under the Court's latest ruling, "a right guaranteed to the rich is denied in practice to the poor." <14> But is that really so unusual, or socially all that undesirable? <15> During the past winter, which was one of the severest on record in many parts of the country, I certainly envied those of my fellow New Yorkers who had the leisure and money to take off for warmer climes until March and skip winter's very real discomforts--and Lord knows plenty of them did: The hotels of Florida and California were booked solid with refugees from the north. <16> Did the State of New York, however, owe a ticket to Miami to every resident who could prove he was unable to afford one?

<17> One sees now a little more clearly where the Court is heading on this deeply divisive question of abortion. <18> A woman's right to have an abortion at will during the first trimester of pregnancy is guaranteed by the Constitution as matters stand, no matter how many Americans believe this amounts to sanctioning a form of murder. <19> But no state will be compelled to finance such an elective abortion--though some states may, and no doubt will, choose to keep on doing so. <20> This accommodates anti-abortion sentiment, to some extent, in those states where it is opposed by a majority of the voters.

<21> Both sides are left to their legislative remedies, if they don't like this disposition of the problem. <22> Abortion advocates can go to work on the legislatures that

have not sanctioned payments for elective abortions; and abortion foes can seek a Constitutional amendment that will prohibit abortions altogether.

THE CONSERVATIVE ADVOCATE by William A. Rusher.

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APPENDIX J
TEXT B5

(No title)

by

George F. Will

<1> The smoldering issue of abortion was not, as abortion advocates jubilantly thought, extinguished by the Supreme Court's 1973 decision. <2> Three related decisions have stilled the jubilation.

<3> The Court has ruled, 6-3, that neither the Constitution nor federal welfare law requires states to pay for medically unnecessary ("nontherapeutic") abortions. <4> Harry Blackmun, who wrote the tortured 1973 ruling, now is tortured by the majority concerning the meaning of what he wrote.

<5> Dissenting in the three latest cases, Blackmun says: "The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but denies the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground that existence and realization are separate and distinct." <6> What is remarkable is that such a reasonable distinction strikes Blackmun as remarkable.

<7> The majority says the 1973 decision protected a

woman's "freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy" but that right "implies no limitation on the authority of a state to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."

<8> When the mayor of St. Louis directs public hospitals not to perform elective abortions, he is, according to the Court, making a constitutional policy choice that is "subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls."

<9> When Connecticut refuses to subsidize elective abortions for poor women it imposes "no restriction on access to abortion that was not already there. <10> The indigency that may make it difficult--and in some cases, perhaps, impossible--for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation."

<11> Of Pennsylvania's refusal to fund elective abortions under its Medicaid program, the Court says: Nothing in the federal statute "suggests that participating states are required to fund every medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical care."

"... the state has a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth.... We will not presume that Congress intended to condition a state's participation in the Medicaid program on its willingness to undercut this important interest by subsidizing the cost of nontherapeutic

abortions." <12> Justice William Brennan, dissenting, defends a lower court's judgment that when a state "refuses to fund elective abortions while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and postnatal care, it weighs the choice of the pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion."

<13> Although Brennan does not think abortion kills a person, he calls a woman seeking an abortion a "mother." <14> Even stranger is his theory that it is unconstitutional for social policy to encourage the choice of childbirth rather than abortion. <15> The two other dissenters are comparably confused.

<16> Justice Thurgood Marshall denounces the "ethical bankruptcy" of persons who do not understand that "under present social policies" it is better to be aborted than to be born poor in America and suffer "second rate" schools and other problems. <17> Marshall supported the 1973 decision that imposed an extremely liberal abortion policy on the states. <18> Now he says that states which stop short of subsidizing elective abortions are trying to "impose their moral choices on the rest of society."

<19> Blackmun asserts that refusal to subsidize unnecessary abortions "punitively" impresses upon the poor a community's "concepts of the socially desirable." <20> Blackmun thinks it is socially desirable and

constitutionally necessary to compel taxpayers to fund a form of killing that many taxpayers consider murder.

<21> The dissenters embraced some particularly repellent and revealing language from a 1975 Court ruling: "Abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy." <22> Abortion enthusiasts are enraged because the decisions reject the idea that social policies must treat childbirth as merely a "medical method" in no way preferable to abortion.

<23> The three recent decisions stop the pro-abortion forces short of their goal, which is to use courts to coerce society into abandoning its moral sensitivity about unrestricted abortion on demand. <24> Regarding policy choices as sensitive as the funding of elective abortions, the Court majority says: "The appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature." <25> Abortion enthusiasts are depressed because they know what awaits them there.

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
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Manuel Gonzalez-Pineiro was born in Orense, Galicia (Spain). After graduating from the Escuela Pericial de Comercio in Orense, he worked for several years. During that time he developed an interest in linguistics.

In 1978, he started graduate work at the University of Florida. Since 1978, he has been a teaching assistant in Spanish and linguistics at the University of Florida. In 1980, he completed an M.A. in linguistics at this university. In October, 1987, he will begin teaching in Vigo, Galicia (Spain).

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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Program in Linguistics in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1987

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